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Abstract 
New Zealand is a country which is extremely prone to seismic activity. One of the many 
impacts an earthquake may have is to cause fires. If a fire was to start in a damaged multi-
storey structure the safety of the occupants would undoubtedly be in question.  
 
During an earthquake large lateral forces are experienced by tall buildings, this in turn causes 
deformations to take place. It is these deformations that can cause damage to various parts of 
the structure. One very important component of any structure is its passive fire protection; 
unfortunately passive protection systems such as Gypsum plasterboard walls are very 
vulnerable to earthquake damage. Discovering the extent to which this reduces the fire safety 
of buildings is the primary objective of this project. 
 
Currently in New Zealand there are no legislative design criteria for the event of fire 
following an earthquake. Another aim of this research is to gain a further understanding of 
this gap between the design of tall buildings for the demands of earthquake and the demands 
of fire. A greater understanding of the risks posed by post-earthquake fire is to be gained by 
addressing the vulnerability of tall buildings. 
 
To determine the level of risk associated with post-earthquake fire the topic was split into two 
parts. The first part involved developing models to calculate a factor of safety for burning 
buildings as a ratio of available and actual escape times. The second part looked at how 
damage to plasterboard walls, protecting escape paths, would affect the fire safety of the 
building. By considering the results of these two parts an overall assessment of the risk 
associated with post-earthquake fire was made. 
 
It was found that for fire following an earthquake in buildings greater than ten stories, in 
which the sprinklers do not operate; the occupants may be unsafe because the expected escape 
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The aim of this research is to gain a further understanding of the gap between design 
of tall buildings for the demands of earthquake and the demands fire. Each of the two 
design cases have well established systems for ensuring adequate performance of a 
structure, but the combination of fire occurring after an earthquake currently has no 
legislative design criteria.  
 
This study attempts to address the problem that is the lack of design criteria for the 
possibility of damage to fire protection systems which has the potential to increase the 
risk of casualties during a post earthquake fire. In particular looking at how tall 
buildings will cope in this situation. Given that there is currently no design criteria for 
fire after earthquake in the New Zealand building code it is the intent of this study to 
make some basic recommendations about further research which may in turn lead to 
some allowance for this scenario in future codes.  
1.2 Background 
The reason that there are no established methods for designing for post earthquake fire 
is that the concept has many unpredictable components. Firstly, not all buildings will 
be damaged in an earthquake so the current system of fire design will be sufficient if a 
fire was to start following an earthquake. Secondly, not all buildings that suffer 
damage in an earthquake will experience a fire. The science around predicting the 
likelihood of such events is so complex that it is not considered a design requirement, 
however given that New Zealand (Christchurch and Wellington in particular) is 
expected to experience a large earthquake in the foreseeable future the combination of 
a fire after an earthquake poses a very real danger. It seems that only by highlighting 
the elevated risk of casualties caused by fire after an earthquake will adequate 
consideration be given to implementing better design requirements in earthquake 
prone regions. 
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1.3 Outline of this Report 
The initial parts of this report explain the background for carrying out the research 
and try to put the problem into context. The analysis is then described and explained 
along with the theory behind the methods used. An extensive breakdown of the results 
obtained through the modelling process is carried out with some conclusions and 
recommendations being made based on these. 
1.4 Deformation Compatibility 
The fundamental concept surrounding damage to a building’s internal partitions 
during an earthquake is deformation compatibility. Internal partitions or fire cell 
divisions constructed from timber studs and plasterboard are erected in tall buildings 
using the same technique as for a single storey home. The major problem is that in a 
single storey house these walls form the majority of the lateral load resisting system 
so ensuring they are tied into the structure effectively is very important. This is done 
according to manuals produced by manufacturers of proprietary lining products. One 
such manufacturer is Winstone wallboards. They manufacture plasterboard known as 
Gib; of particular relevance to this study is a fire resistant product called Gib Fyreline. 
In the design guide published by the manufacturers they specify a certain framing 
system for which the board has been tested and rated, this ensures that the board 
performs up to the expected/tested level. This type of system is summarised in Figure 
1-1. 
 
Figure 1-1 Basic timber dry-wall configuration (Winstone Wallboards, 2001) 
When this passive fire protection system is installed in a multi-storey building the 
same method of construction is followed as for a one storey domestic dwelling. This 
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poses some problems as the framing is often rigidly connected to both the floors 
above and below. Generally the plasterboard will only go as far as the false ceiling but 
the framing timber is fixed to the structural floor above. In the event of an earthquake 
the wall will suffer severe damage due to inter-storey drift. Inter-storey drift is defined 
as the amount of relative deflection between adjacent floors (Figure 1-2). 
 
 
Figure 1-2 Inter-storey drift for a simple five storey frame building. 
 
The 1992 loadings code, NZS 4203 sets inter-storey drift limits in Cl 4.8.1.5 . The 
following limits must not be exceeded for the corresponding storey where deflections 
are found by either equivalent static method, modal response spectrum or elastic time 
history method; 
 
0.02 (2%) for building height ≤15m 
0.015 (1.5%) for building height ≥30m 
Interpolate between limits for buildings between 15 and 30 m high. 
 
This study is particularly interested in buildings less than 58 metres tall as under the 
current building code buildings of this height or less only require an F-fire rating 
(firecell rating) as opposed to a S-fire rating (structural rating) (Approved Documents 
Fire Safety C/AS1:2000, BIA). For the purpose of this study it will be assumed that 
all buildings have been designed right up to code limits, which in some cases may 
even be conservative.  In this case a building under 15 m tall with standard 3.5 m floor 
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heights can have inter-storey drifts of up to 70 mm while a building over 30 m tall 
with the same floor height may experience drifts of up to 52 mm. 
 
Deflections calculated using elastic analysis as used in the equivalent static design 
method may be reduced by a scale factor of 0.85 for buildings with six stories or 
more. Linear interpolation is used for buildings between one and six stories high 
where the scale factor for a one storey building is one. For buildings with a soft storey 
the scale factor is always taken as 1.0. For numerical integration time history methods 
incorporating inelastic member response, inter-storey deflections shall not exceed 
0.025 of corresponding storey height. 
1.5 Method 
In order to establish the significance of post earthquake fires in tall buildings the topic 
has been separated into two parts. The two parts can then be evaluated together to 
gauge the overall risk associated with the way fire safety design is carried out in New 
Zealand. The entire study is mainly interested in small footprint buildings typically 
with 10 to 15 floors. This is because this type of building is commonly used for 
apartments and in many cases the buildings have only a single stairway. It also helps 
to simplify the evacuation modelling and means that we can accurately estimate the 
number of people likely to be in the building at any one time. 
 
The first part looks at how the current system for fire resistance in tall buildings copes 
under the recently developed “real compartment fire” scenarios. To do this the time to 
failure of plasterboard partitions in modern multi-storey buildings exposed to the real 
fire scenario will be compared with the time taken to evacuate the building. This will 
be done by modelling equivalent fire severity from the International Standards 
Organisation standard fire (which is used to give fire resistance ratings) with the 
severity of real compartment fires, giving a modified time to failure for the wall. This 
will give an indication of how long occupants have to escape the building. The factor 
of safety in current fire safety design under the current building code can therefore be 
established. 
 
The second part of this study will look at how the earthquake and the associated inter-
storey drifts will affect plasterboard drywalls in multi-storey buildings. This will be a 
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strictly qualitative study looking at previous testing done on similar wall 
configurations. A progression of likely effects on plasterboard walls at different 
percentage drifts will be looked at; the subsequent damage at each interval can then be 
evaluated in terms of its effect on the fire resistant properties of the walls. 
 
By considering both of these studies some conclusions can be drawn about the fire 
safety of tall buildings in New Zealand after a major earthquake. For example if the 
evacuation time and time to failure of a partition adjoining the main evacuation route 
are relatively similar (i.e. factor of safety close to 1) then any negative effect from 
damage caused to the partition by the earthquake will further reduce the likelihood of 
safe evacuation.  
1.6 Previous Post-Earthquake Fires 
Fires following an earthquake are a major hazard and in some cases can be more 
devastating than the earthquake itself. The damage caused by fires following an 
earthquake varies significantly, from minor damage to destruction recognised as the 
most damaging natural events of the twentieth century. Two such events were the 
1906 San Francisco and the 1923 Tokyo earthquakes.  
 
The San Francisco event happened at around 5 am on the 18th of April 1906 and 
measured 8.3 on the Richter scale and an intensity of MM IX (Modified Mercalli 
scale, see Appendix A). Scawthorn et al (1988) reported that the earthquake 
originated in the San Andreas Fault and caused 1992 $US7 billion worth of damage. 
Botting (1998) summarised the damage as extensive including 700 fatalities. There 
were 50 reported outbreaks of fire in the three hours following the earthquake which 
resulted in 3 days of conflagration. During this time approximately 20,000 buildings 
were destroyed by fire. The fires were eventually confined to a four square mile block 
by blasting un-burnt buildings to form a fire break. There were three main ignition 
sources; the first was the collapse of buildings containing fires in open fire places, lit 
kerosene lamps and gas lights. The second was the fracturing of electrical wiring 
caused by structural damage to buildings, and the final ignition source was the 
crossing of 550 volt, tram wires with other wires which caused sparking and arcing or 
working electrical appliances and circuits in nearby buildings. The earthquake itself 
took out the main water supply in San Francisco; this caused some major problems in 
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terms of containing the fires. The pipelines were damaged where they crossed marshy 
land, totally shutting down the city wide distribution system. Due to the absence of 
water the fire department could do little in response to the outbreak of the fires and 
fires were allowed to grow rapidly and aided by a persistent wind the fires quickly 
grew to conflagration size.  
 
The Tokyo event was similar in that it happened early in the twentieth century and 
was made worse by the primitive fire protection systems of the time. Also known as 
the Kanto earthquake it also measured 8.3 on the Richter scale as reported by Kenna, 
1975. Fatalities were much higher with around 100,000 killed in the greater Tokyo 
region. Over 450,000 houses were destroyed by fire after 277 initial outbreaks. Again 
the loss of the main water supply occurred and as such the fires were unable to be 
contained. 
 
A New Zealand example is the 1931 Hawke’s Bay earthquake which measured 7.75 
on the Richter scale killed in excess of 250 people throughout Hawke’s Bay. Fires 
broke out in three locations in Napier destroying ten acres of buildings. The fire 
fighting effort was significantly hampered by the fact that fire engines were buried in 
the collapsed fire station and water mains were fractured. Fires started in three 
separate chemist shops where chemical vapours were ignited by Bunsen burner 
flames. Ruptured electrical wiring may also have caused fires to start. Overall, lack of 
water was the main reason for the extent of damage.  
 
All three of the above-mentioned events took place early last century and significant 
developments in both fire safety design and the technology used to fight fires have 
been made. The alarming point though is the common theme, which is the loss of 
main water supplies to the cities affected. This over reliance on fire fighter 
intervention and the assumption that water will be available to fight fires with is still a 
problem today. On this basis it will be assumed that for all situations evaluated in this 
report that there will be no fire fighter intervention.  
 
More recently, water mains were damaged in the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, San 
Francisco. Fire fighters in northern parts of San Francisco were forced to use 
alternative sources such as swimming pools. In terms of probability, Taylor (2003) 
 7 
noted that following a moderate earthquake (MMVII-MMVIII) the probability of 
failure of a building sprinkler system was 0.90 (increased to 0.99 for a design level 
earthquake). This probability was primarily based on damage to water and power 
supplies. This has also been highlighted by Brunsdon and Clark (2000) who 
commented on the vulnerability of power and water supplies in New Zealand. 
 8 
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2 Wellington Case Study 
2.1 Background  
Wellington, the capital city of New Zealand and home to over 160,000 people lies 
straddling a major fault. The city is bounded by the waters of Wellington harbour on 
one side and steep hills on the other. The central part of the city is relatively flat with 
the residential suburbs extending into the hilly surroundings, covering some extremely 
steep topography. Much of the waterfront land in downtown Wellington is reclaimed 
land which is particularly vulnerable to soil liquefaction during an earthquake.  
 
The location of Wellington has meant that transport routes in and out of the city are 
very limited, with one route being through the steep Ngauranga gorge and the other 
through the Hutt valley and over the rugged Rimutaka Range (Figure 2-1). Both of 
these routes would be prone to landslides if a major earthquake were to hit the area. 
There is also major concern about the capacity of these transport routes after such a 
disaster given that so many people would potentially be trying to exit the city.  
 
The reason for carrying out this case study of Wellington is to emphasise how 
vulnerable New Zealand buildings are to the risk of post-earthquake fire by 
highlighting the specific risks faced by the city. 
 
Figure 2-1 Basic map of Wellington showing the main transport routes, (New Zealand homestay 
website 2003) 
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The central city itself is very congested and given that land is at a premium there are 
many high-rise buildings, the majority of which are office buildings but more and 
more medium rise apartment style buildings are being built. Aside from the more 
recent buildings (1970 and newer) there are a number of un-reinforced masonry 
structures. These buildings will be particularly prone to heavy structural damage 
during an earthquake.  
 
The compact nature of the city means that following an earthquake it is highly likely 
that traffic will completely gridlock meaning that emergency services will have 
problems getting around.  
 
There have been two independent reports on the risk Wellington faces from 
earthquake. Both report casualties of between 200 and 400 people following a shallow 
7.5 magnitude earthquake on the Wellington fault. Large scale damage and loss will 
occur over the majority of the city. Seismic hazard maps have been developed which 
show where the damage will be most severe. 
 
After an earthquake the potential for fire and fully blown conflagrations to occur is 
very high. The main ignition sources could include electrical faults, ruptured gas lines 
and chemical fires. Wellington city has three pipelines used to transport hazardous 
materials (Wellington City Council Website). The first carries high pressure natural 
gas right through the city, the second diesel and light fuel oil around the port facility 
near to the central business district, and the third carries highly volatile aviation fuel 
from the port to the airport. Damage to one of these pipelines during an earthquake 
could cause serious a explosion or fire. Given its location and infrastructure, 
Wellington is a very interesting place to consider in terms of post-earthquake fire. 
2.2 Geological/Seismological Background 
The geological and seismic background of the greater Wellington region is very 
complex as shown in Figure 2-2. The basement rocks throughout the greater 
Wellington region are grey sandstone/mudstone sequences with some coloured 
mudstone conglomerate. The areas of reclaimed land are made up of domestic waste, 
sand boulders and rock. In the Petone and Hutt Valley areas the land is primarily 
swamp deposit consisting of poorly consolidated silt, mud, peat and sand (Figure 2-2) 
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The Wellington fault which is the primary seismic feature of the region is itself split 
into three main segments. This segmentation is based on past rupture history which 
suggests that the fault experiences movement in three individual pieces. The southern 
most segment is known as the Wellington-Hutt Valley segment and extends from 
offshore in the Cook Strait (approx 20 km south of Wellington city) to Kaitoke at the 
southern end of the Tararua ranges, totalling 75 km in length. The second segment of 
the fault runs north 55 km from Kaitoke to Putara. The final and most northern of the 
segments is the Pahiatua segment extending from Putara northeast to Woodville. This 
segment is 45 km long. North of Woodville the fault is known as the Mohaka fault  
(Field guide to New Zealand Active Tectonics 1994). 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Geological map of the greater Wellington region showing position of Wellington Fault, 
(Institute of Geological and nuclear Sciences Website) 
 
In addition to the Wellington fault there are two other significant fault zones that 
could have a large impact on Wellington city if movement was to occur along them. 
They are the Ohariu Fault and the Wairarapa Fault. The Ohariu Fault runs along the 
southern west coast from cook strait and up through the Kapiti coast. The Wairarapa 
Fault has two segments, one an offshore segment in cook strait which strikes 
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approximately north east and a the main segment which extends from lake Wairarapa 
up through the Wairarapa depression again striking approximately north east. 
2.3 Risk Analysis for Fires Following an Earthquake 
There have been several comprehensive studies carried out to evaluate the potential 
damage that Wellington would sustain following an earthquake. For the purpose of 
this report two of these are particularly important. The first, a research project by 
Brunsdon and Clark, (2000) Modern Multi-story Buildings and Moderate 
Earthquakes. The second report of interest is by Cousins et al, (2002) Estimating 
Risks from Fire Following Earthquake. 
 
Brunsdon and Clark were particularly interested in the effect of earthquakes on 
buildings and in doing so looked at the likely level of inter-storey drifts that would 
occur and how this may translate into both structural and non-structural damage. 
The principal findings of the work by Brunsdon and Clark are as follows; 
• They characterised a moderate earthquake as one which generates MM8 
intensity in intermediate soils. For Wellington this translates to a magnitude 
6.0 to 6.5 earthquake. This type of event has an approximate return period of 
140 years and a probability of occurrence of 30% over a 50 year period. 
• Inter-story drifts for a thirteen storey moment resisting frame building 
designed to NZS 4203:1984 in the moderate earthquake described above 
would range from 10 to 15mm. This indicating that both structural and non-
structural damage would occur in buildings of this type in such an event. 
Other major findings of the report were that damage expected in low MM scale 
earthquakes would cause more damage that suggested in the descriptions that 
accompany the lower MM scales. Also that damage ratios for modern buildings will 
be significantly higher than previously expected 
 
This work was not restricted to Wellington but is important in that it underlines the 
expected level of damage in what is described as a moderate earthquake. The non 
structural damage associated with the inter-storey drifts quoted above being of 
particular interest to this study given that most fire partitions are non-structural. 
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The second report of interest, Cousins et al (2002) looks at fire as a consequence of 
large earthquakes. They looked at the potential for fire spread within Wellington city 
based on GIS (Geographic Information System) maps. The aim being to both develop 
working models of this spread and to help estimate potential losses associated with 
fires starting in different locations throughout the city and in different climatic 
conditions, namely wind.  
 
Cousins et al developed two models, one static and one dynamic. The static model 
was primarily based around the theory of fire spread by radiant heat. They established 
a value of 12 metres as the maximum distance that fire could travel in order to spread 
across a void. The model was constructed by placing a six metre buffer around all the 
buildings in central Wellington and hence wherever there was an overlap between the 
buffers it was assumed that fire could spread. Figure 2-3 shows a portion of this static 
model, as can be seen groups of closely spaced buildings have the inherent potential 
for fire spread between them. 
 
Figure 2-3 Static fire spread model with 12m fire spread buffers (INGS, 2002) 
 
The second model constructed was dynamic in that it allowed for wind and was based 
on a far more complex map where the whole of Wellington was divided up into 10 
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metre by 10 metre squares. These “cells” were then designated as either combustible 
or non-combustible. For fire to spread a combustible cell had to come into contact 
with another combustible cell. This dynamic model was the main focus of the 
research and was developed specifically for use by the New Zealand fire service. One 
significant advantage of the dynamic model is that it can be run in real time. This 
means that actual wind speed data can be fed into the model in order to obtain actual 
fire spread data. The applications for this type of data are extraordinary as actual fires 
can be modelled in an emergency and people evacuated from the most likely path of 
any major conflagration.  
 
The dynamic fire spread model developed by Cousins et al has underlined the 
significance of wind in the spread of fires in Wellington. To illustrate this, the model 
was run under four different wind conditions; calm breeze, moderate breeze, fresh 
breeze and near gale. The results of these four wind scenarios can be seen in Table 2-1 
Table 2-1 Effect of different wind conditions on fire damage in Wellington, Cousins et al 2002. 
Wind Speed Calm Moderate Breeze Fresh Breeze Near Gale
Number of buildings burnt 358 362 409 1503
Area Burnt (1000 m2) 46 47 50 140
Loss (NZ$, millions) 87 89 100 310  
2.4 Emergency Response 
Following a major earthquake the emergency services in Wellington will be over 
stretched. The most important service as far as this report is concerned is the Fire 
Service. Wellington City falls in the Arapawa fire region. This region extends from as 
far north as Otaki and the Wairarapa and into the south island to include the 
Marlborough, Tasman and Nelson areas. The Arapawa fire region is comprised of 51 
fire stations, 36 of which are made up of volunteers and only 15 have paid staff. 
Accompanying these stations are 95 fire engines and a total of 1365 staff of which 
only 350 are full time paid fire fighters (New Zealand fire Service website). This may 
seem like quite a significant number of staff however given the large size of the 
region and the level of devastation expected following a major earthquake resources 
would be pushed to the limit. For example a fire in a tall office building in downtown 
Wellington could require more fire fighters than the region has to offer. Fires in tall 
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buildings require huge amount of man power to control as the fatigue imposed on fire 
fighters when battling a blaze after climbing stairs is immense. For example, when the 
First Interstate Bank Building in down town Los Angeles caught fire on the 12th floor 
it required over 200 fire fighters to control. This alone would totally drain the majority 
of the resources possessed by the Wellington City fire service. Not to mention the 
possibility that the cities transport system is likely to gridlock preventing easy 
movement of emergency services. For modelling purposes in this study the likelihood 
of intervention by fire fighters in a post earthquake blaze has been assumed to be nil.  
 16 
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3 BRANZ Deformation Report (literature review) 
3.1 Background 
This section of results is primarily a literature review looking at the results of some 
testing on timber framed, gypsum plasterboard clad walls. The report is by Deam, B.L 
(1997) and titled Seismic Ratings for Residential Timber Buildings, BRANZ 
(Building Research Association of New Zealand.) Study Report SR73.  
 
The aim of the research was to gain a better understanding of why timber framed 
structures behave like they do in earthquakes. It was already well known that timber 
framed structures perform very well under seismically induced lateral loads, 
essentially due to the large number of building elements that make up the structure 
and the mechanism of load sharing. To make full use of these performance enhancing 
characteristics in a design sense the mechanics of load sharing needed to be 
determined. This was done by matching experimental load test data with a computer 
model so that the model could then be used to generate seismic response spectra.  
 
The most relevant part of this research for this report is the experimental testing of 
timber framed walls. The walls that were tested under dynamic lateral loads are very 
similar to the walls being considered in this report. Four different walls were tested. 
All four were made from light timber framing and clad with gypsum plasterboard. 
Two of the walls had the plasterboard sheets attached horizontally while the other two 
walls had the sheets attached vertically. The vertical method of construction is the one 
most commonly used in New Zealand so the performance of these two walls was of 
particular interest.  
 
The testing involved building 4.8 metre long, 2.4 metre high sections of wall. The 
framing was made from 100 x 50 mm timber framing, and the cladding gypsum 
plasterboard. The plasterboard was fixed according to manufacturers specifications. 
The walls were then attached to a racking rig which was used to load the walls in a 
cyclic fashion deflecting the walls laterally an equal distance in both directions. The 




Figure 3-1 Loading rig with wall in place ready for testing, Deam B.L. 1997. 
3.2 Testing Results 
Of the four tests carried out only the two involving vertically oriented plasterboard 
sheets will be looked at.  
3.2.1 Wall 1 
Wall 1 was referred to as “Specimen LW2” in the BRANZ report. It was intended to 
be representative of wall construction normally used in New Zealand, Deam, B.L. 
(1997). It had four 1.2 m long by 2.4 m high plasterboard sheets attached to ex 100 x 
50 framing. The plasterboard was fixed by 30 x 2.5 mm flat head nails at 300 mm 
centres around the perimeter of the board, and to the intermediate studs with pairs of 
nails spaced at 300mm.  
 
The wall was tested over nine different cycles with the deflections ranging from ± 
10mm to ± 60mm. Once the nine cycles were finished the specimen was pushed to 
failure. To make the results of this experiment relevant to this project the lateral 
deflections have been converted to percentage drift values. This means that the 
damage observed in these tests can be related to timber partitions in multi-storey 
buildings and some conclusions made about the significance of the damage for fire 
safety. This is based on the assumption that the walls are fixed at the top and bottom 
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plates to the floor and ceiling of the multi-storey building. Table 3-1 is a summary of 
the testing carried out including the % drift applied to the specimen. 








Percentage Drift Required 
to cause Equivalent 
Damage
mm mm %
+1 10 9.0 0.38%
-1 -10 -9.2 0.38%
+2 15 14.2 0.59%
-2 -15 -14.6 0.61%
+3 15 14.6 0.61%
-3 -15 -15.0 0.63%
+4 30 30.6 1.28%
-4 -30 -30.6 1.28%
+5 30 31.0 1.29%
-5 -30 -31.0 1.29%
+6 60 62.6 2.61%
-6 -60 -62.1 2.59%
+7 60 62.8 2.62%
-7 -60 -62.4 2.60%
+8 60 62.9 2.62%
-8 -60 -62.1 2.59%
+9 60 62.9 2.62%
-9 -60 -62.4 2.60%  
The equivalent inter-storey drifts imposed on the wall during testing ranged from 
0.38% to 2.6%. This drift range is ideal for assessing the likely damage a wall in a 
multi-storey building may experience as the inter-storey drift limits are 2% for 
buildings less than 15 metres tall and 1.5% for buildings greater than 30 metres tall.  
 
During the testing visual observations were made about damage to the wall. The 
descriptions were made over a range of cycles for which noticeable damage occurred.  
 
Cycle 1 (±10mm); It was noted that there was some deformation of the plasterboard 
around the nails in the bottom framing plate but not other visible damage. This level 
of damage can be assumed to have little to no effect on the fire resistance of the wall 
as the minor deformation would not cause an increase in heat transfer through the 
wall. Given that the deformation took place on the bottom plate of the wall no smoke 
would be likely to penetrate any gap created around a nail as smoke would not be 
present that low to the ground. 
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Cycles 2 to 3 (±15mm); through this set of cycle’s significant plasterboard 
deformation was observed around the nails at the top and bottom plates and in the 
lower region of the end studs. The largest deformations took place along the bottom 
plate where a 20 x 30 mm piece of plasterboard broke away adjacent to a corner nail. 
Some minor deformation was also noted around the nails in the intermediate studs. 
This level of damage is likely to have some negative impact on the way the wall 
behaves when exposed to fire. The corner where a piece of the board actually broke 
away could allow heat and flames to melt any insulation material in the inner wall and 
begin to degrade the plasterboard on the cold side of the wall. Also the noted 
deformation of the plasterboard around the nails in the top plate could mean smoke 
may be allowed to pass through the wall. From this it would be fair to say that at drift 
levels of around 0.6% the fire resistance of the wall starts to be affected. 
 
Cycles 4 to 5 (±30mm); this set of cycles saw all of the nails in the end studs pulled 
through the edge of the plasterboard. Other than this there was no further damage 
observed. The effect of the nails pulling out of the edge of the board would mean that 
flames and smoke may be allowed pass through the small gap. This may not be 
significant enough to cause fire to spread from one room to another but by definition 
the fire resistance of the wall would have been compromised.  
 
Cycles 6 to 9 (±60mm); the damage that occurred during this time was reported to be 
similar but more extensive than that observed in cycles 4 to 5. It was noted in cycles 4 
to 5 that significant damage to cause the wall to loose its fire integrity had occurred so 
any further damage would exacerbate the situation. 
 
Finally the wall was pushed to failure. The wall was racked to +290 mm, this would 
be an equivalent drift of 12.1 % and hence is very unlikely to occur in a multi-storey 
frame. The damage to the wall was extensive. The studs were pulled through the 
plasterboard until they were no longer attached at the bottom. The studs themselves 
developed significant curvature with some breaking free from the top plate. This 
damage can be seen in Figure 3-2. 
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Figure 3-2 Wall 1 at failure, racked to +290 mm, Deam B.L. 1997. 
3.2.2 Wall 2 
Wall 2 (specimen LW3) was set up in the same way as wall one only the nails used to 
attach the plasterboard to the framing had proprietary steel washers around them. The 
wall was tested over 15 cycles ranging from 10 mm to 90 mm. A summary of the 
loading cycles is shown in Table 3-2. 
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Percentage Drift Required 
to cause Equivalent 
Damage
mm mm %
+1 10 7.0 0.29%
-1 -10 -8.3 0.35%
+2 15 11.5 0.48%
-2 -15 -13.4 0.56%
+3 15 11.7 0.49%
-3 -15 -13.9 0.58%
+4 24 20.3 0.85%
-4 -24 -22.4 0.93%
+5 24 20.6 0.86%
-5 -24 -23.0 0.96%
+6 36 33.2 1.38%
-6 -36 -30.0 1.25%
+7 36 34.9 1.45%
-7 -36 -36.0 1.50%
+8 36 35.5 1.48%
-8 -36 -35.9 1.50%
+9 36 35.6 1.48%
-9 -36 -36.4 1.52%
+10 36 35.3 1.47%
-10 -36 -36.5 1.52%
+11 36 35.7 1.49%
-11 -36 -36.4 1.52%
+12 60 59.8 2.49%
-12 -60 -72.9 3.04%
+13 60 85.2 3.55%
-13 -60 63.0 2.63%
+14 90 90.9 3.79%
-14 -90 -92.3 3.85%
+15 90 93.0 3.88%
-15 -90 -93.3 3.89%  
The range of drifts experienced by wall 2 was much greater ranging from 0.29% to 
3.89 %. It is unlikely that a building would experience drifts of more than 3%, so the 
damage that occurs to the wall in cycles 13 to 15 is not that relevant.  
 
Cycle 1 (±10 mm); very little damage was observed around the nails for this cycle. 
This was because the whole wall section separated from the floor for a bout 1m at the 
wall end. This happened because the load applied to get the 10 mm deflection caused 
an uplift force greater than the gravity load applied to keep the wall in place. This 
means that very little can be concluded about how the damage would affect the fire 
resistance of the wall as it is assumed that the bottom plate would remain attached to 
the floor in a real building. 
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Cycles 2 to 3 (±15mm); some damage occurred around the nails in the bottom corners 
of the wall but again the uplift of the bottom plate meant very little damage. The 
damage that did occur would have had a similar effect to the fire resistance of the wall 
as was observed for cycle 1 in the first wall, that is some smoke could penetrate the 
wall if substantial smoke were present that close to the ground. 
 
Cycles 4 to 5 (± 24mm); further plasterboard damage was noted around the nails. This 
damage was similar to that observed in wall1 such that some fire spread may occur 
through gaps opening up at the top and bottom plates of the wall. 
 
Cycles 6 to 11 (±36mm); during cycle 6 the plasterboard joint between the two central 
sheets failed. The nails in the centre stud were pulled completely through the edge of 
the sheets allowing the wall to behave as two individual units for the remainder of the 
testing. This mode of failure does not help in terms of assessing the likely impact on 
the fire resistant properties of a wall in a real multi-storey building. This is because 
the walls in a real building are assumed to be fixed top and bottom and are not able to 
rock up on one corner as was observed in this test. The separated wall units can be 
seen in Figure 3-3. 
 
Figure 3-3 Wall 2 during the 6th cycle, showing separation into individual units, Deam B.L. 1997. 




Cycles 14 to 15 (±90mm); the now separated wall units deformed independently with 
one rocking over on its corner while the other translated horizontally. The wall that 
translated horizontally suffered the most damage with the plasterboard being detached 
from the bottom half of the framing. The section of the wall that rocked over 
remained fairly well intact. The damage sustained by the wall that translated was 
extensive and would have little to no fire resistance in terms of integrity as the board 
was not longer attached to the framing which would allow easy spread of smoke and 
flames to neighbouring rooms.  
 
As in the testing of wall 1 the wall was pushed to failure. It managed a total 
displacement of 150 mm; this translates to an equivalent inter-storey drift of 6.25 %. 
This is unlikely to occur in a real building so nothing can really be taken from the 
damage sustained. 
3.3 Discussion 
The results of these racking tests give a valuable insight into the level of damage that 
can be expected in timber infill walls in multi-storey buildings by representing the 
applied deformations from the tests as a percentage inter-storey drift.  
 
The first wall tested had a good range of drifts applied to it given the code limits of 
1.5 and 2 % from the New Zealand loadings code, NZS 4203. The damage sustained 
by the wall system became significant at a drift level of around 0.6%. This is where 
significant deformation of the plasterboard around the nails used to attach it occurred. 
This deformation would be significant enough to allow fire to penetrate the wall. The 
fact that this sort of damage can occur at such low levels of drift is somewhat 
alarming. The code limit for a building over 30 metres tall is 1.5 %, this is more than 
twice that applied to the wall for it to experience significant damage. The following 
cycles caused further damage and it was assumed that the wall had lost all fire 
resistance at a drift of 1.3%, again this is less than that specified in the New Zealand 
Loading code. This highlights the vulnerability of timber partitions under the current 
loadings code. 
 
The second wall tested showed slightly different behaviour. In some ways the second 
test was not quite as valuable as the first. The deflections the wall was subjected to got 
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up to 90 mm which is equivalent to an inter-storey drift of 3.75 % and hence is 
outside the allowable range from the loadings code. The behaviour of the wall was 
also less than ideal in that the lateral loading caused the wall to rock on one edge 
before the wall separated into two individual units. This was because the uplift created 
by the lateral load exceeded the gravity loading applied to the wall. It is assumed that 
in a real multi-storey structure that the wall would have significant attachment to the 
floors above and below it that this would not be possible. Aside from this there was 
still the alarming deformation around the nail lines which once pulled right out could 
allow the spread of smoke and flames from one compartment to another.  
 
Both of the walls sustained enough damage to significantly reduce their fire resisting 
properties. This would be especially important if the wall is adjacent to an escape path 
from a building such as a stairwell. Full details of this testing can be found in the 




4 Simulation and Analysis 
4.1 Spreadsheet Analysis 
All of the calculations for the simulation and analysis in this study was carried out in 
excel spreadsheets. There were two main sheets, one for the calculation of the 
equivalent fire resistance of the wall assembly in question and one sheet for 
calculating evacuation times for the building. There were three buildings used and 
each building had four different scenarios. The scenarios were; 
1. Building fire alarms and lighting available following an earthquake 
2. Fire alarms working but no lighting ( Night time) 
3. Lighting but no fire alarms 
4. No fire alarms or lighting available. 
This meant that there were a total of 12 spreadsheets for all of the buildings and 
scenarios. In order to collate the data for all of the scenarios a final spreadsheet was 
developed and a macro written that collected all of the data from the other 12 
spreadsheets. This meant that the most up to date data was collected and stored 
together in one spreadsheet. The macro code used to collect this data is included as 
Appendix #. 
 
The basic fire situation for all of the buildings is the same. That is a fire is assumed to 
start on the lowest occupied floor. The occupants must evacuate to below this floor to 
be considered safe. The main assumptions associated with this situation are; 
• Building sprinklers are not working. 
• No fire fighter intervention. 
• Single and double stairways become unusable once the partition between them 
and the fire has failed; failure is as defined in section 4.2.  
• Double stairways are contained within a single shaft (scissor stairs). 
4.2 Fire Resistance Ratings 
A fire resistance rating (FRR) is a rating, usually expressed in units of time (minutes) 
of how long a certain fire resistant object can withstand exposure to the ISO 834 
standard fire. The ISO 834 standard fire is used to test a certain product’s fire 
resistance. Under the ISO fire temperature increases over time with no decay, as 
 28 
defined by the International Standards Organisation (ISO, 1975). The temperature, T 
(oC) is defined as  
( ) oTtT ++= 18log345 10  
Where t is the time in minutes and To is the ambient temperature, Buchanan, A H 
(2001). The standard time versus temperature curve for the ISO standard fire is shown 

























Figure 4-1 ISO 834 Standard fire time versus temperature curve for 30 minutes 
It is this standard fire that is used to determine fire resistance ratings of both generic 
and proprietary fire protection items. A fire resistance rating has three components 
based on the three possible failure modes of an object exposed to fire. They are 
stability, integrity and insulation. 
 
Stability is a measure of whether a structural element such as timber beam can still 
carry out its load resisting function. This is often determined by failure when loaded 
or by reaching a certain deflection limit. The rating in this case is the amount of time 
an element can carry out its function under exposure to the ISO fire. 
 
Integrity is a measure of products ability to prevent fire spread from one room to 
another. This means that if cracks or penetrations form due to the exposure to heat 
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then the item has failed. The rating is the time the product can be exposed to the 
standard ISO fire before cracks from that may compromise integrity. 
 
Insulation is a measure of how well a barrier prevents the flow of heat; again this is 
primarily to avoid fire spreading from one room to another. The definition of failure is 
the cold side of the barrier staying below an average temperature of 140oC. It is at this 
temperature that fire may start. So the rating in this case is a measure of how long the 
cold side of a barrier stays below an average temperature of 140oC while exposed to 
the ISO fire. 
 
Testing of passive fire protection components and systems are carried out in furnaces 
where the temperature can be set to follow the time versus temperature curve in 
Figure4-1. In New Zealand this testing is carried out at the Building Research 
Association of New Zealand at their testing facility in Wellington.  
 
For the buildings in this study a FRR of 30/30/30 has been assumed. After this time it 
assumed that a person can no longer safely get passed the wall in question. This is a 
broad assumption in that the wall may experience an insulation failure which would 
probably not stop a person from safely getting past. The assumption is made for 
simplicity and is deemed fair given that current fire design deems an insulation failure 
to be significant. 
4.3 Real Compartment fires 
Although the majority of fire safety design is carried out using the ISO standard fire, 
more and more effort is being put into modelling what are known as “real fires”. This 
is because modern plastics and other composite materials are becoming more common 
and these products when ignited can generate much higher temperatures than are 
usually allowed for. This study had adopted two design fires which take into account 
the probability that real compartment fires may become a lot hotter than allowed for 
by the ISO standard fire. 
 
The first is known as the Eurocode Parametric fire. This fire gives a time-temperature 
profile that allows for different fuel loads, wall lining materials and ventilation 
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openings (Buchanan A.H, 2001). The temperature, T (oC) of the fire is defined by the 
following equation 
( )*** 197.12.0 472.0204.0324.011325 ttt eeeT −−− −−−=  
where t* is a fictitious time measured in hours, given by 
tt Γ=*  











where b is the square root of the thermal inertia of the compartment lining (gypsum 
plasterboard in this case). And Fv  is the ventilation factor given by 
tvvv AHAF =  
where 
vA  is the area of the window or ventilation opening (square metres) 
vH  is the height of the window opening (metres) 
tA  is the total internal surface area of the room (square metres) 
 
For the Eurocode fire Fref and bref are 0.04 (√m) and 1160 (Ws0.5/m2K) respectively. 
This definition is from Buchanan, A.H (2001), Structural Design for Fire Safety. 
 
As can be seen from the definition above the temperature of the fire is highly 
dependant on the room geometry, including the size of any ventilation openings and 
the insulation of the walls. A room with well insulated walls and a large ventilation 
opening will experience much higher temperatures than a room with poor insulation 
and no ventilation.  
 
The Eurocode parametric fire may be modelled with a decay period. This decay 
period starts at the end of the burning period, td. The burning period is defined as the 
time taken for all of the fuel in the compartment to be consumed. This time is directly 
proportional to the fuel load of the room, ef (MJ/m2). Fuel loads for the rooms in this 
study have been taken from Appendix D of the Fire Engineering Design Guide 
(2001). The rate at which a Eurocode fire decays depends on the duration of burning. 
Fires with a burning period of less than half an hour will decay at a constant rate of 
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625oC per hour, decreasing in a linear fashion to 250oC per hour for fires with a 
burning period of over two hours.  
 
The second fire that is used for this analysis is the modified Eurocode fire. This is 
essentially the same as the standard Eurocode fire only the value of bref has been 
increased from 1160 Ws0.5/m2K to 1900 Ws0.5/m2K. This results in significantly 
higher temperatures. As there is more confidence in the accuracy of the standard 
Eurocode fire this will be the main focus of the analysis. Figure 4-2 shows time-
temperature curves for the ISO 834 standard fire, the Eurocode parametric fire, and 






















Figure 4-2 Time-temperature curve for the three design fires being used, fuel load is 300 MJ/m2, 
and ventilation factor of 0.05 m0.5. 
As can be seen in Figure 4-2 the three fire curves are quite different even though the 
same parameters were used in the calculations. The modified parametric fire is by far 
the hottest reaching almost 1200 degrees Celsius. Because the duration of burning is 
directly proportional to the fuel load both of the parametric fires begin to decay at the 
same time, the ISO standard fire is independent of the fuel load hence it shows no 
decay period. 
4.4 Equivalent Fire Severity Modelling 
Fire resistance ratings are based on exposure to the ISO standard fire, however recent 
research has shown that in fires contained within relatively small compartments reach 
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much higher temperatures. This means that a fire resistant system exposed to what are 
referred to as “real” or “compartment” fires may fail well before its specified rating 
time. This is because these compartment fires generate much higher heats and 
therefore more severe exposure. This is a major problem if the building element 
which fails prematurely is being relied on to ensure safe evacuation of a building’s 
occupants.  
 
Testing of this theory was carried out by Nyman J.F. (2002) and some guidelines as to 
how to estimate the failure time of building elements exposed to real fires established. 
Several tests were carried out in which small compartments made of timber and light 
steel frames clad with plasterboard were burnt. Wooden cribs and furniture were used 
as fuel and the time to failure of different parts of these compartments were measured. 
Of the thirteen different set-ups tested all but one failed well within the time that was 
established during testing exposed to the ISO standard fire. Of particular interest to 
this project was the performance of the 30 minute rated light timber frame with 
gypsum plasterboard lining set-up. This wall configuration lasted 23 minutes from 
time of ignition compared with 42 minutes in the standard furnace test, Nyman J.F. 
(2002).  This is around half the expected performance which poses some serious 
problems if it were the critical part of a fire safety design. The mode of failure in this 
case was insulation failure. 
 
This testing showed that under real fire conditions building elements rated using the 
standard fire did not last as long as expected. From the results obtained it was 
established that the time to failure of non-load bearing timber drywalls could be 
predicted based on the equal energy area concept, Nyman J.F. (2002). Simply this 
means that the amount of radiant heat energy produced by the ISO standard fire in a 
set amount of time can be produced in a much shorter time by a real compartment fire. 
When a wall system is exposed to a fire the main way that damage is inflicted is by 
radiant heat transfer. According to basic thermodynamic theory radiant heat energy 
can be quantified by a function in which temperature is raised to the fourth power.  
 
Nyman proposed that the severity of a fire can be quantified as the cumulative radiant 
heat energy which is applied to the wall assembly being tested. The cumulative 
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radiant heat energy is calculated by evaluating the area under a radiant energy plot. 





4'' εσ (KJ/m2) 
where, 
''Q  is the radiant heat flux incident upon the wall (W/m2) 
ε  is the emissivity (conservatively assumed as 1) 
σ  is the Stefan Boltzman constant (5.67x10-8W/m2.K4) 
t  is the time from the start of burning (minutes) 
T  is the compartment temperature (K) 
 
The main benefit of this method of comparison is that any time-temperature curve can 
be compared to the ISO 834 standard fire test. For this study, two existing design fires 
will be used to approximate a real compartment fire. They are the fires mentioned in 
the previous section, the Eurocode parametric fire and the modified Eurocode 
parametric fire. 
 
An example of this method of equivalent fire severity is shown in Figure 4-3 ; where 
the time to failure of a 30 minute system, as determined in the standard furnace test is 
compared with the theoretical time to failure when exposed to the Eurocode 






























Figure 4-3 Graphical representation of the equivalent fire severity based on the equal energy 
area method. 
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The plot in Figure 4-3 show the development of fire severity based on radiant heat 
energy from time of ignition of the three design fires. To estimate the time to failure 
of a wall from a time versus severity curve such as the one shown in Figure 4-3 there 
is three main steps; 
1. Establish the severity of the ISO 834 standard fire at the desired fire resistance 
rating, in the case above the FRR is 30 minutes which gives a severity of 10 
MJ/m2, this was found by taking a vertical line from the 30 minutes point on 
the time axis until it intercepted the ISO severity line. 
2. Draw a horizontal line from the intercept with the ISO line back to the real fire 
curves. 
3. (a) For the Eurocode failure time drop a vertical line down from the in 
intercept of line 2 and the Eurocode severity curve to the time axis and read 
off the equivalent failure time. For the above example this is 14.8 minutes. 
(b) For the modified Eurocode fire do the same but at the intercept of line 2 
and the modified Eurocode severity curve. For the example above this gives an 
equivalent failure time of 11 minutes. 
In the equivalence model used for this study this three step process was made 
automatic by calculating the values used to construct the chart from Figure 4-3 and 
then using the VLOOKUP function in Microsoft excel. The VLOOKUP function can 
automatically find desired values in a table of data and then return values from other 
columns in the table in the corresponding row. In this case the function was used to 
find the time at which the real fire’s had the same severity as the ISO standard fire 
given an initial time to failure i.e. a fire resistance rating. The spreadsheets used for 
this calculation are included as Appendices D, E and F. 
 
By applying this theory to each of the buildings being tested times to failure of the 
walls protecting the stairways were calculated. This time was assumed to be the 
available time occupants had to safely escape from the building. 
4.5 Escape Modelling 
The time taken for occupants to exit a multi-storey building is a very complex thing to 
model. For the purpose of this study a simplified approach will be implemented such 
that the effects of the earthquake on escape time can be easily adjusted and the 
outcomes evaluated. For example the model assumes that after an earthquake any lifts 
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in the building will not be operational for both means of escape or for use by 
emergency services. The model used in this analysis uses the following assumptions: 
• The fire starts on the bottom lowest occupied floor of the building 
• The fire is in the compartment adjacent to the stairwell 
• The partition between the stairwell and compartment is constructed from 
timber framing and gypsum plasterboard. 
• Lifts are not operational following an earthquake 
• All of the people in the building are physically able to travel down stairs 
unassisted and at a reasonable speed. 
• The movement of people down stairs can be modelled in a linear fashion 
• Only the last person on each floor is modelled as this is the most critical. 
• Queuing at doorways is directly proportional to occupant density. 
• The width of the stairway does not impact on the flow rate of occupants. (for 
simplicity, however if a particular building with an unusually wide or narrow 
staircase was being analysed allowances could be made)  
• No intervention by emergency services such as fire fighters. (This is based on 
the likelihood that following a major earthquake the services will under-
staffed.) 
 
The model itself is based on an uncontrolled total evacuation as discussed in the SFPE 
handbook (2002). This particular way of thinking assumes that each floor of 
occupants is modelled as a single entity, that of the last person to leave each floor. 
This means that the total time for building evacuation is the time taken by the “group” 
of evacuees from the upper-most level in the building to reach safety. Figure 4-4 
shows the escape model from the SFPE Handbook (2002) used to design the model 










Figure 4-4 Hypothetical uncontrolled total evacuation of a 15-storey office building (SFPE 
Handbook, 2002) 
The model takes into account the time taken for the fire to be recognised and the 
decision to evacuate the building to be made. There is an allowance in the model for 
whether alarm systems are operational after the earthquake. Once the occupants have 
reacted the time taken for the furthest person to reach the exit is calculated using a 
standard speed for moving in a relatively unconfined space of 73 metres per minute. 
This speed is assumed for when the evacuation takes place in daylight hours or when 
lighting/emergency lighting is available. When evacuation takes place in the dark this 
speed is significantly reduced. Because of the restricted access into a stairway there is 
an allowance for queuing time associated with access to the stairs. This queuing time 
is based on the method used in the Fire Engineering Design Guide (FEDG, 2001). The 
method takes into account the width of the exit and applies a boundary layer to either 
side of it, making the exit effectively narrower than it is. This boundary layer allows 
for the fact that people will be moving through a relatively narrow gap and thus cause 
a reduction in their travel speed. 
 
Following the reaction time the model then allows a delay period for the evacuation of 
people in the floor below. This is calculated as the time taken for the occupants in the 
floor below to travel down two flights of stairs. This assumption was made so that 




The time taken to traverse the stairs is calculated by dividing the length of stair each 
“group” must traverse to reach the exit level by the expected travel speed. The 
expected travel speed for traversing down stairs when fully lit is 30 metres per minute. 
This was taken from the SFPE Handbook which assumed a speed of 0.5 metres per 
second down the stair slope allowing approximately two treads of stair per person. 
Again during blackout circumstances this value was dramatically reduced in the 
model. This part of the model is quite optimistic in that it does not allow for people 
with disabilities. If occupants were impaired in any way such as blind, immobile, or 
elderly the travel speed would have to be significantly reduced. One of the 
assumptions of the model is that all occupants are of able body. 
 
Finally as each “group” reaches the exit level of the building a further queuing delay 
is added to allow for passing through an exit to the street. This assumes that evacuees 
only have to move through one exit after the stairs. In many cases this will be 
conservative. 
 
The total time for evacuation is a sum of the time taken by the top floor to reach 
safety. A graphical representation of the movement of each floor down the building 






























Figure 4-5 Graphical representation of simplified escape model, represents the vertical location 
of each "group" of evacuees with respect to time from ignition. 
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By looking at the movement down the building of occupants on the 20th floor of an 
arbitrary building we can see the various stages of evacuation. The initial, relatively 
shallow slope is representing the time taken from the ignition of the fire until the 
stairway is clear for them to descend. During this time they are assumed to actually 
move down one flight of stairs because in reality the occupants will not patiently wait 
at the top of the stairs for the people below to evacuate they will push down as far as 
they can. The next leg of the model shows the descent of the occupants down the 
stairs. Finally there is a slight kink at the bottom of the model showing the queuing 
time at the bottom exit. 
 
4.6 Validity of the Model 
In order to evaluate the validity of this simplified model, specific escape modelling 
software called Simulex was used. Simulex is a computer modelling package that is 
used to simulate the escape of people from large complex buildings. 3D models of 
multi-storey buildings can be made up base on CAD floor plans connected by 
staircases. Once the model of the building is loaded the user is able to define a final 
exit, which is the point where all occupants much reach to be considered out of the 
building. The software then calculates all the distances that must be travelled by 
occupants to escape. Occupants are placed throughout the building and then 
evacuation of the building is simulated. The properties of the occupants of the 
building are based on real life data such that people have different walking speeds and 
show different behaviour.  
 
The floor plan of building 1 was used to develop an eleven story Simulex model. 
Once the model had been loaded 14 people were added to each floor so that the 
assumptions matched those made for case study building 1. Some refinement was 
required in terms of the way floors were linked together as some of the people became 
stuck during the evacuation. Results of this simulation are included in the results 
section of this report. A screen shot from Simulex is shown in Figure 4-6. 
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Figure 4-6 Simulex model of a typical floor in building 1. 
Figure 4-6 shows the floor plan of building 1 used to construct the 3D Simulex model. 
The stairway is in the bottom right corner and the 14 people can be seen in the various 
rooms on the floor. 
 
4.7 Case Study Buildings 
In order to get a broad range of results three different building layouts and designs 
will be analysed. The buildings were chosen so that a broad range of scenarios could 
be analysed while two of the buildings are similar enough to draw conclusions about 
the effect of various layouts. It is assumed that the construction techniques for the 
timber framed gypsum plaster drywalls do not vary between buildings. All three of 
these buildings are based on actual designs which for the purpose of this report will 
remain anonymous.  
 
The first building, referred to as “Building 1” is an eleven storey apartment building 
with an approximate footprint area of 450 square metres. The building has only one 
set of stairs. As mentioned in the description of the escape model the two lifts in the 
building are assumed to be out of order following an earthquake. The staircase of this 
building is actually on the outside of the building and open to the air so the danger of 
smoke filling the staircase is not an issue. The wall between the staircase and the 
adjacent apartment has a design Fire Resistance Rating of 30 minutes and is to be 
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constructed from timber framing and gypsum plasterboard. Each floor has seven 
apartments and it is assumed that each apartment has two occupants giving a total of 
14 people per floor. The model assumes that a fire starts in the apartment directly 
adjacent to the stairs on the lowest occupied floor and as it happens this is the kitchen 





Figure 4-7 Typical floor plan of building 1, origin of fire on level 1 can be seen adjacent to the 
stairs. 
This building was chosen as it is representative of a number of modern medium rise 
buildings being built in all New Zealand’s main centres at the moment. Apartment 
buildings are more often than not made up of multiple compartments or separate cells 
which mean that the “compartment fire” scenario exists. The building was also chosen 
as apartment buildings are occupied at night when the risk of casualties in a fire are 
much higher due to people sleeping and lack of sufficient lighting to guide people to 
safety. All of these things have been taken into account. For this particular case the 
earthquake is assumed to take place at night. All dimensions and room details are 
contained within Appendix D. 
 
The second building is referred to as “building 2”. This building is also an apartment 
building and relies on a double stair housed in a single shaft as a means of escape. 
Due to the stairs being in one shaft this, means that if the shaft is penetrated by fire 
then both stairs are assumed to become unusable at the same time.. The building is 16 
stories tall of which the top ten are used for apartments. The bottom six storeys are 
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used for car parking. The street level escape is located on the fourth floor however for 
this study the occupants only need to get themselves below the level which the fire is 
on. Again the fire is assumed to start adjacent to the stairwell on the lowest occupied 
floor (level seven).  
 
Each occupied floor has a total of nine units with varying occupant numbers. Based 
on the number of beds there are assumed to be a total of 36 people per floor. This 
gives a total of 360 people that need to be evacuated. The maximum distance that any 
one evacuee needs to travel on a floor to reach the stairs is 20 m. the internal walls 
between the stairs and the apartments are constructed from timber framing and 
gypsum plasterboard. A Fire Resistance Rating of 30 minutes has been assigned to 
these walls. To make the necessary fire calculations some assumptions about the 
ventilation in the apartment where the fire starts have been made. The only opening is 
a sliding door that accesses a small decking. The full dimensions and details are 
included in Appendix E. The approximate layout of building 2 is shown in Figure 4-8. 
STAIRS21 M
21 M  
Figure 4-8 Typical floor plan of building 2, origin of fire on level 6 can be seen adjacent to the 
stairs. 
Because both building’s 1 and 2 are medium rise apartment buildings comparisons 
can be made where they differ in physical layout. The first major difference between 
building 1 and 2 is that building two has the potential to house a lot more people. This 
means that by comparing the outcomes of the models some conclusions about 
occupancy rates can be made. The next major difference is that the double stairwell in 
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building 2 can accommodate twice as many people as the single stairwell in building 
1. Also the stairs are located in different positions, for building 1 they are situated on 
the outside of the building and are not enclosed. The stairs in building 2 are located in 
the centre of the building. This has two effects; the first is that the average distance 
travelled by occupants to get to the stairs is less for building 2. The second effect is 
that for building two there is potential for smoke penetration into the stairs.  
 
The third building is a 16 storey office building and is referred to as “building 3”. The 
building is assumed to have 90 occupants per floor and is open plan in nature. The 
fact that the building is open plan means that some major assumptions about the 
design fire have to be made. The large open plan area of this office space is much 
larger than the other two buildings so the validity of using the compartment fire model 
is questionable. So that there is continuity throughout the study it is assumed that the 
compartment fire model can be used with the following assumptions; 
• The entire area of the office is assumed to act as two fire compartments; this is 
assuming that the stairs and other services in the centre of the building act as a 
partition splitting the building floor plan in two. 
• Only a portion of the windows nearest to the fire will shatter to provide 
ventilation to the fire. This was assumed to be 2/3’s of the windows on the 
wall closest to the fire at ignition.  
 
The building has a typical floor area of 936 square metres. The greatest distance an 
occupant must travel to reach the stairs is 20 metres. Because of the number of 
occupants and height of the building it is assumed that there is a double staircase in 
the centre of the building. As for building two the stairs are assumed to be in a single 
shaft. This is for simplicity as it is assumed that if the stair shaft is penetrated by fire 
both of the staircases become unusable. Because the building is only 16 stories it has 
an effective escape height of less than 58 metres therefore the fire resistance rating 
required for the partition between the stairs and the rest of the building is only 30 






Figure 4-9 Typical floor plan for building 3, origin of fire on 1st floor shown in lower half of plan 
area. 
This building was chosen for a number of reasons. The first is that the previous two 
buildings are residential in nature and hence will only really be full outside of 
standard working hours. This building therefore represents the risks associated with a 
medium rise office building. One advantage this building has is that it will not be 
affected by the loss of lighting as it assumed that there will be sufficient natural light 
during operating hours for people to escape. For the scenarios where there is assumed 
to be no lighting it is assumed that there is only five people on each floor.  
 
Another reason for choosing this building was that is had a large number of occupants 
so valuable conclusions about evacuation time and the number of occupants per floor 
can be made.  
 
All of the buildings fall within the Acceptable Solution C/AS1 for fire design as part 
of the New Zealand Building Code. All of the buildings have an escape height of less 
than 58 metres which allows them to only require 30 minutes of protection to the 
escape routes.  
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4.8 Timber Wall Configuration 
The critical part of the fire design for this study has been assumed to be the survival of 
the timber drywalls between the fire and the stairs. All of these walls were assumed to 
have been built in accordance with the New Zealand Building code and made up of 
proprietary components as specified in the “Gib Fire Rated Systems” catalogue. The 
catalogue is published by Winstone Wallboards Ltd, 2001.  
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5 Results 
5.1 Verification of Escape Model Using SIMULEX 
Several runs of the simulation were carried out to get a good approximation of the 
random evacuation of the eleven storey apartment building. The overall evacuation 
took 14 minutes and 33 seconds. There were several observations made during the 
period of evacuation;  
• The people rushed for the exits initially causing major blockages around the 
entrances to stairwells.  
• Some of the slower occupants held up the progress of the majority of the 
occupants 
• When slow people were in the stairs they were often passed by faster people 
this often resulted in blockages as there was not enough room in the stairs for 
this passing manoeuvre to take place. 
Overall the simulation seemed to be a good approximation of an unorganised 
simultaneous evacuation of a multi-storey building. The output text file from this 
simulation is included as Appendix C. 
5.2 Building 1, (11 storey apartment building) 
The modelling of building 1 involved four different scenarios. The four scenarios 
were; 
1. Post earthquake fire where the buildings alarm system was fully operational 
and sufficient emergency lighting was available to help people escape. 
2. Post earthquake fire with alarms working but no emergency lighting 
3. Post earthquake fire without alarm systems or emergency lighting. 
4. Post earthquake fire where the buildings alarm system was not working due to 
damage or interference from the earthquake but still sufficient lighting to aid 
escape. 
 
The first scenario involved a fire starting on the ground floor of the building adjacent 
to the stairwell. The fire rating of the partition separating the stairs and the fire was 30 
minutes. By the method of equivalent fire resistance outlined in section 4.4 the 
partition would last only 14.5 minutes when exposed to the Eurocode parametric fire 
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and 10.5 minutes when exposed to the Modified Eurocode parametric fire. For this 
study the results of the buildings under the Eurocode fire are deemed to be the most 
important. Therefore the time occupants have to get from their respective floors to the 
ground floor exit is 14.5 minutes. It is assumed that after this time the partition 
between the fire and stairs is compromised by any of the failure modes described in 
section 4.2.  
The escape time for this first scenario was 15 minutes. This time includes some 
allowance for recognising the alarm and deciding what action to take. Because the 
time taken to escape exceeds the time to failure of the partition between the fire and 
the stairs the factor of safety was 0.97 (where factor of safety = time available for safe 
escape / time actually taken to escape). From the escape model it was determined that 
at time of failure of the wall there was still one whole floor still to be evacuated. This 
meant a total of fourteen people were put at risk. 
 
Scenario two had the same failure time for the wall as in scenario one. The escape 
time was 27.8 minutes. This included 5 minutes of reaction time by the occupants due 
to alarm failure. Given this escape time a factor of safety of 0.52 resulted. Using the 
escape model at time of failure of the wall approximately 6 floors remained un-
evacuated. This amounted to 84 people being put at risk. 
 
In scenario three it took 31.67 minutes to evacuate the building which gave a factor of 
safety of 0.46. Again the escape included 5 minutes of reaction time but also the travel 
speed of the occupants was assumed to halve due to their being insufficient lighting. 
At the time of failure of the wall in question there were still 8 floors to be evacuated. 
This resulted in 112 people being put at risk. 
 
Scenario four saw a total evacuation time of 18.9 minutes. This yielded a factor of 
safety of 0.77. This left four floors unable to be evacuated, and resulted in 56 people 























































































     Available Escape Time
 
Figure 5-1 Actual escape times compared with available escape times for building 1.   
Figure 5-1 is a summary of the results from the four scenarios tested for building one. 
The spreadsheets used to calculate this data are included as Appendix D. All design 
assumption, dimensions and fire design fire parameters are included in the 
spreadsheets.  
5.3 Building 2, (16 storey apartment building) 
Building two was modelled under the same four scenarios as for building one. 
 
Again the specified fire resistance rating of the partition was 30 minutes. Exposed to 
the Eurocode parametric fire it lasted for only 16.5 minutes and exposed to the 
modified Eurocode fire it lasted 12 minutes. Again the results of the Eurocode fire are 
the most important.  
 
In scenario one, the total evacuation time for the building was 8.7 minutes. This is 
significantly less than that found for building one, probably a result of the double 
stair. As the time to failure of the critical wall exceeded the time taken for full 
evacuation the factor of safety was found to be 1.9. Because the factor of safety was 
greater than one it is assumed that everyone from the building safely escaped. This 
assumption does not allow for any of the expected reduction in failure time caused by 
the physical degradation of the wall by the earthquake. 
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In scenario two it took 14.58 minutes to evacuate the building. This gave a factor of 
safety of 1.13. Again no people were put at risk in this scenario. 
 
Scenario three had an evacuation time of 18.48 minutes. This gave a factor of safety 
of 0.89. At the time of failure of the critical wall approximately 2 floors remained un-
evacuated. As there were assumed to be 36 people per floor a total of 72 people were 
put at risk under this scenario. 
 
The fourth scenario had an evacuation time of 12.6 minutes; this yielded a factor of 



















































































































     Actual Escape Time    
Available Escape Time
 
Figure 5-2 Actual escape times compared with available escape times for building 2.   
Figure 5-2 is a summary of the actual and available escape times. It shows that only 
under scenario 3 are any of the occupants of the building at risk. The spreadsheets 
used to calculate this data are included as Appendix E. All design assumption, 
dimensions and fire design fire parameters are included in the spreadsheets.  
 
5.4 Building 3, (16 storey office building) 
Building three was modelled under the same four scenarios as buildings one and two. 
The only difference is that the number of occupants was adjusted for the scenarios 
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where there were no lights. This is because the building is assumed to have very few 
occupants during the dark, night hours. 
 
The design fire resistance rating of the wall between the fire and the stairs was 30 
minutes. The equivalent time to failure when exposed to the Eurocode parametric fire 
was 17.5 minutes. When exposed to the modified Eurocode parametric fire the wall 
was expected to last 12.5 minutes. 
 
For scenario one the evacuation time was 14.15 minutes, this gave a factor of safety of 
1.24. It was expected that there would be no people put at risk under this scenario. 
 
Under scenario two the evacuation time was 20.72 minutes. This gave a factor of 
safety of 0.84. Three floors remained un-evacuated at time of failure of the critical 
wall. Because this scenario was assumed to take place at night only five people were 
assumed to be on each floor so the total number of people put at risk in this scenario 
was limited to 15. 
 
Scenario three saw an evacuation time of 27.6 minutes. This gave a factor of safety of 
0.63. This meant that approximately 9 floors were not able to be evacuated. Again this 
scenario took place at night so the total number of people put at risk was 45.  
 
Scenario four had a total evacuation time of 16.05 minutes. For this a factor of safety 
of 1.09 was achieved. In this case no people were put at risk as the time taken to 
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Figure 5-3 Actual escape times compared with available escape times for building 3. 
Building three was only unsafe for the night time evacuations as shown in figure 5-3. 
The spreadsheets used to calculate this data are included as Appendix F. All design 
assumption, dimensions and fire design fire parameters are included in the 
spreadsheets.  
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6 Discussion of Results 
 
From the results of the spreadsheet analysis it is obvious that the most dangerous 
building was the 11 storey apartment building. All four of its scenarios achieved a 
safety factor of less than 1. This essentially means that the building is unable to be 
safely evacuated in any of the scenarios. The first building is critical as it has only a 
single stair. 
 
The second building (16 storey apartment building) was slightly more conservative as 
far as its results were concerned. Of the four scenarios tested only the worst case, 
scenario 3 resulted in a safety factor of less than 1. This showed that if an apartment 
building had two stairs that the chance of people being put in danger was significantly 
decreased. The other item that may have lead to the greater safety factor was that the 
stairs were located in the centre of the building as opposed to on the outside wall. This 
meant that the distance travelled by each of the escapees was less hence a reduction in 
the time taken to evacuate the building. 
 
The third building (16 storey office building) showed fairly similar results to the 
second building in that the only scenario with a safety factor of less than 1 was when 
the lighting was assumed to have been lost. Again in this case the building had a 
double stair which helped to minimise escape time. The number of people actually put 
at risk in scenarios two and three is limited because it is an office building these 
scenarios can only take place at night when there would be very few people in the 
building. 
 
The four different scenarios used for this analysis involve a very diverse range of 
situations. The first scenario is the most probable in that it assumes that the building 
alarm systems are operational and that there will be sufficient light for the occupants 
to escape. This is fair considering that it is highly unlikely that an earthquake will 
cause sufficient damage to cause an electronic alarm system to fail. Emergency 
lighting is also likely to be available given that it is a requirement under C/AS1, the 
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acceptable solutions for fire design in the New Zealand building code that multi-
storey buildings have battery powered emergency lighting in the emergency exits.  
 
The second and third scenarios are definitely worst case scenarios as they both assume 
loss of emergency lighting. The chance that loss of lighting would occur is highly 
unlikely as mentioned above.  
 
The fourth scenario is less likely than the first but not totally inconceivable. The 
chance of an alarm system failing is highly unlikely however there may still be 
situations where people become unresponsive to the alarm. One such situation may 
occur if the earthquake itself causes a false fire alarm, if once back inside the building 
the occupants hear another alarm they may presume that it is another false alarm.  
 
One situation that is not considered by the scenarios above is the possibility that 
following a large earthquake all of the buildings occupants decide to leave the 
building regardless of whether there is a fire. This is less likely to happen during the 
night but is still possible. In contrast to this a fire may not start following earthquake 
for quite some time, and if people had initially left a building following the 
earthquake they might return before a fire has even started. 
 
The escape models used do not take account of damage that may actually restrict safe 
passage of the occupants. Major internal damage may jam doors or cause large objects 
to block narrow passages. This situation is nearly impossible to quantify so it has been 
conservatively omitted from the model. 
 
Failure of a plasterboard wall by insulation may not increase the risk of injury to 
people trying to escape past the wall. A section of wall becoming hot is not likely to 
make a stairwell unusable. The two modes of failure which are most critical for 
protecting escape paths are stability failures and integrity failures. 
 
To gain a more conclusive insight into the overall fire safety of these buildings 
following an earthquake it is necessary to consider the impact of seismic damage to 
the critical timber partitions. Of the twelve scenarios (four for each building) nine 
returned a factor of safety of close to or less than one. For any of these cases the 
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physical damage caused by the earthquake to the walls will only serve to exacerbate 
the potential for injury. If it is assumed that the earthquake causes inter-storey drifts of 
around 0.7 % then significant damage would occur and result in the fire resistance of 
the wall being reduced as mentioned in section 3.3. This may mean that each of the 
three buildings is then faced with at least one dangerous scenario even when 




• For fire following an earthquake in buildings greater than ten stories, in which 
the sprinklers do not operate; the occupants may be unsafe because the 
expected escape time is greater than the expected failure time of the fire rated 
walls surrounding the escape route. 
 
• Safety is further decreased if alarms and/or emergency lighting do not operate. 
 
• Buildings with a single stair are particularly vulnerable. 
 
• Safety would be greatly increased if the Building Code required structural (S) 
ratings for all buildings less than 58 metres high. In the current approved 
document only buildings above this height require S ratings. Buildings 
between 30 and 58 metres tall are particularly vulnerable as they only require 
an F rating of 30 minutes of fire resistance protecting the exit routes. The 
results of the analysis carried out suggest that by increasing this rating to 60 
minutes much of the risk would be eliminated. 
 
The above conclusions assume no damage to the plaster board walls surrounding the 
exits. 
 
• The way in which plasterboard walls are constructed in multi-storey buildings 
makes them especially prone to damage when lateral deformations take place 
which will result in a further decrease in safety. Where these relatively weak 
partitions are attached directly or indirectly to the floor above and below they 
can experience severe drifts and hence major damage. A new less rigid way of 
attaching these sheets may be one way to mitigate the damage caused. Finding 
a system that is “flexible” and fire resistant may prove difficult. 
 
• The damage sustained by plasterboard walls when exposed to lateral loads is 
fairly localised. The damage is mainly seen as deformation of the board 
material around the nails used to attach the sheets to the timber framing. It 
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appears that this is not likely to cause the board to actually detach from the 
framing but its performance as a fire resisting element becomes highly 
questionable. Damage starts to affect the performance of a fire resisting wall at 
drifts of around 0.6 %. This a major concern given that the New Zealand 
loadings code NZS 4203 1992 allows 1.5 % to 2.0% drift depending on storey 
height. 
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8 Recommendations for Further Research 
 
• To get a full understanding of how structural damage to plasterboard will 
affect its fire resistance some experimental testing may be beneficial. To rack 
a full scale plasterboard wall and then test it in a furnace would provide some 
valuable information for any future studies of this nature. 
• Alternative methods for attaching the plasterboard sheets to the framing could 
be investigated such that a degree of lateral movement is catered for. This 
could only be used in multi-storied buildings where the walls do not form part 
of the lateral load resisting system. 
• Further testing and verification of the equivalent fire severity methods used in 
this project could be carried out. Room dimensions could be varied to see if 
the method can be applied to much larger compartments. The theory could 
also be tested on wall configurations other than just plasterboard, light pre-cast 
concrete walls may be one. 
• Testing of racked plasterboard walls for smoke penetration could be done. The 
purpose of this would be to evaluate the risk of smoke penetrating escape 
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10 Appendix A; Modified Mercalli Earthquake 
Intensity Scale  
 
I. People do not feel any Earth movement.  
II. A few people might notice movement if they are at rest and/or on the upper 
floors of tall buildings. 
III. Many people indoors feel movement. Hanging objects swing back and 
forth. People outdoors might not realize that an earthquake is occurring.  
IV. Most people indoors feel movement. Hanging objects swing. Dishes, 
windows, and doors rattle. The earthquake feels like a heavy truck hitting 
the walls. A few people outdoors may feel movement. Parked cars rock.  
V. Almost everyone feels movement. Sleeping people are awakened. Doors 
swing open or close. Dishes are broken. Pictures on the wall move. Small 
objects move or are turned over. Trees might shake. Liquids might spill out 
of open containers.  
VI. Everyone feels movement. People have trouble walking. Objects fall from 
shelves. Pictures fall off walls. Furniture moves. Plaster in walls might 
crack. Trees and bushes shake. Damage is slight in poorly built buildings. 
No structural damage.  
VII. People have difficulty standing. Drivers feel their cars shaking. Some 
furniture breaks. Loose bricks fall from buildings. Damage is slight to 
moderate in well-built buildings; considerable in poorly built buildings.  
VIII. Drivers have trouble steering. Houses that are not bolted down might shift 
on their foundations. Tall structures such as towers and chimneys might 
twist and fall. Well-built buildings suffer slight damage. Poorly built 
structures suffer severe damage. Tree branches break. Hillsides might 
crack if the ground is wet. Water levels in wells might change.  
IX. Well-built buildings suffer considerable damage. Houses that are not bolted 
down move off their foundations. Some underground pipes are broken. The 
ground cracks. Reservoirs suffer serious damage.  
X. Most buildings and their foundations are destroyed. Some bridges are 
destroyed. Dams are seriously damaged. Large landslides occur. Water is 
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thrown on the banks of canals, rivers, lakes. The ground cracks in large 
areas. Railroad tracks are bent slightly.  
XI. Most buildings collapse. Some bridges are destroyed. Large cracks appear 
in the ground. Underground pipelines are destroyed. Railroad tracks are 
badly bent.  
XII. Almost everything is destroyed. Objects are thrown into the air. The 
ground moves in waves or ripples. Large amounts of rock may move. 
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11 Appendix B; Visual Basic for Applications Code, 
Data Retrieval Macro. 
Sub Retrieva1() 
' 
' get_num Macro 
 
'Macro written by: Geoff S. Sharp 14/8/03 
 
'This macro was created to retrieve data from 12 different 
'spreadsheets. This meant that the most up to date data was 
'used. It made it a lot simpler to keep track of any 
'changes made to the scenario spreadsheets. 
 
'get ISO 834 Fire time to failure 
    ChDir "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My Documents\Project\Building 1" 
    Workbooks.Open Filename:= _ 
        "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My Documents\Project\Building 
1\A,L.xls" 
    Windows("Results.xls").Activate 
    Range("B10").Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
        "='[A,L.xls]Main Calcs'!R22C13" 
     
'get Eurocode time to failure 
    Range("B11").Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
        "='[A,L.xls]Main Calcs'!R23C13" 
    
'get Mod. Euro duration 
    Range("B12").Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
        "='[A,L.xls]Main Calcs'!R24C13" 
     
'get floor num 
    Range("B14").Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
        "='[A,L.xls]Simple escape model'!R10C2" 
        
'get people/floor 
    Range("B15").Select 
    ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
        "='[A,L.xls]Simple escape model'!R11C2" 
        
'get evac times 
 
            'A,L 
                Range("B19").Select 
                ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
                    "='[A,L.xls]Simple escape model'!R45C2" 
                 
            'A,NL 
            ChDir "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1" 
                Workbooks.Open Filename:= _ 
                    "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1\A,NL.xls" 
                Windows("Results.xls").Activate 
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                Range("C19").Select 
                ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
                    "='[A,NL.xls]Simple escape model'!R45C2" 
                 
            'NA,NL 
            ChDir "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1" 
                Workbooks.Open Filename:= _ 
                    "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1\NA,NL.xls" 
                Windows("Results.xls").Activate 
                Range("D19").Select 
                ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
                    "='[NA,NL.xls]Simple escape model'!R45C2" 
               
            'NA,L 
              ChDir "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1" 
                Workbooks.Open Filename:= _ 
                    "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1\NA,L.xls" 
                Windows("Results.xls").Activate 
                Range("E19").Select 
                ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
                    "='[NA,L.xls]Simple escape model'!R45C2" 
                  
'Get floors at risk figures 
 
            'A,L 
                Range("B21").Select 
                ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
                    "='[A,L.xls]Simple escape model'!R55C2" 
                                         
            'A,NL 
            ChDir "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1" 
                Workbooks.Open Filename:= _ 
                    "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1\A,NL.xls" 
                Windows("Results.xls").Activate 
                Range("C21").Select 
                ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
                    "='[A,NL.xls]Simple escape model'!R55C2" 
                 
            'NA,NL 
            ChDir "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1" 
                Workbooks.Open Filename:= _ 
                    "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1\NA,NL.xls" 
                Windows("Results.xls").Activate 
                Range("D21").Select 
                ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
                    "='[NA,NL.xls]Simple escape model'!R55C2" 
                 
            'NA,L 
              ChDir "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1" 
                Workbooks.Open Filename:= _ 
                    "C:\Documents and Settings\Geoff Sharp\My 
Documents\Project\Building 1\NA,L.xls" 
 65 
                Windows("Results.xls").Activate 
                Range("E21").Select 
                ActiveCell.FormulaR1C1 = _ 
                    "='[NA,L.xls]Simple escape model'!R55C2" 
     
'Closing opened workbooks 
Windows("A,L.xls").Close 










12 Appendix C; SIMULEX Model of Building 1, 
Output File 
Number of Floors = 11 
Number of Staircases = 12 
Number of Exits = 1 
Number of Links = 22 
Number of People = 168 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 0 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 1 : (17.20,1.43 m), 0.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 0 
Exit 1 : (20.50,2.10 m), 0.00 degrees, 0.80 m wide 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 1 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 2 : (16.90,2.70 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 0 
Link 3 : (19.10,0.80 m), -90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 1 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 2 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 4 : (16.92,2.93 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 1 
Link 5 : (19.10,0.60 m), -90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 2 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 3 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 6 : (16.90,2.70 m), 88.83 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 2 
Link 7 : (19.70,0.30 m), -90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 3 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 4 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 8 : (17.30,2.96 m), 90.84 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 3 
Link 9 : (19.38,0.30 m), -90.00 degrees, 1.00 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 4 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 5 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 10 : (16.65,2.95 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 4 
Link 11 : (19.70,0.70 m), -90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 5 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 6 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 12 : (16.90,2.80 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 5 
Link 13 : (19.80,0.50 m), -90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 6 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 7 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
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Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 14 : (16.90,2.90 m), 92.73 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 6 
Link 15 : (19.10,0.60 m), -90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 8 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 8 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 16 : (16.80,2.70 m), 85.91 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 8 
Link 17 : (19.40,0.60 m), -90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 9 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 9 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 18 : (17.20,2.60 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 9 
Link 19 : (19.80,0.90 m), -90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 10 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 10 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 20 : (17.30,2.60 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 10 
Link 21 : (19.30,0.80 m), -83.66 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 11 
----------------------------------------------- 
Floor 11 (DXF file : geoff.dxf) 
Number of People Initially in This Floor = 14 
Link 22 : (16.80,2.50 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Staircase 11 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 1 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 3 : (0.75,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 1 
Link 4 : (0.65,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 2 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 0 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 1 : (0.80,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 0 
Link 2 : (0.80,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 1 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 2 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 5 : (0.70,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 2 
Link 6 : (0.80,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 3 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 3 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 7 : (0.90,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 3 
Link 8 : (0.75,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 4 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 4 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
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Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 9 : (0.80,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 1.00 m wide, connected to 
Floor 4 
Link 10 : (0.75,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 5 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 5 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 11 : (0.75,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 5 
Link 12 : (0.80,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 6 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 6 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 13 : (0.95,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 6 
Link 14 : (0.80,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 7 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 7 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 8 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 15 : (0.75,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 7 
Link 16 : (0.90,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 8 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 9 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 17 : (0.55,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 8 
Link 18 : (0.75,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 9 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 10 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 19 : (0.85,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 9 
Link 20 : (0.70,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 10 
----------------------------------------------- 
Staircase 11 (1.50 m X 12.00 m) 
Number of People Initially in This Stair = 0 
Link 21 : (0.95,0.00 m), 270.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 10 
Link 22 : (0.95,12.00 m), 90.00 degrees, 0.70 m wide, connected to 
Floor 11 
----------------------------------------------- 
All people reached the exit in 14:33.7. 
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13 Appendix D; Simulation and Analyses 
Spreadsheets for Building 1. 
 
1. Severity calculations 
2. Raw temperature and severity output data 
3. Time versus temperature plot 
4. Fire severity plot 
5. Simple escape model for Scenario 1 
6. Simple escape model for Scenario 2 
7. Simple escape model for Scenario 3 
8. Simple escape model for Scenario 4 
9. Table of results 
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Time Severity t* Severity t* Severity Time 
Min o C o K MJ/m 2 - o C o K MJ/m 2 - o C o K MJ/m 2 Min
0 20.0 293.0 0 0 0 273.0 0 0 0 273.0 0 0
0.5 261.1 534.1 0.004976 0.0725647 505.4175 778.4 0.012992 0.194678 702.4742 975.5 0.025828706 0.5
1 349.2 622.2 0.023985 0.1451293 657.0967 930.1 0.103578 0.389356 788.0393 1061.0 0.208694951 1
1.5 404.3 677.3 0.054305 0.217694 717.3033 990.3 0.248172 0.584033 842.8671 1115.9 0.447444941 1.5
2 444.5 717.5 0.094544 0.2902586 752.3697 1025.4 0.423667 0.778711 885.6813 1158.7 0.731999184 2
2.5 476.2 749.2 0.143738 0.3628233 779.2418 1052.2 0.621748 0.973389 919.9787 1193.0 1.057148233 2.5
3 502.3 775.3 0.201156 0.4353879 802.398 1075.4 0.839607 1.168067 948.0295 1221.0 1.418174897 3
3.5 524.5 797.5 0.266213 0.5079526 823.1515 1096.2 1.076016 1.362744 971.4634 1244.5 1.811000068 3.5
4 543.9 816.9 0.338431 0.5805172 841.9973 1115.0 1.330146 1.557422 991.4557 1264.5 2.232241357 4
4.5 561.0 834.0 0.417405 0.6530819 859.2049 1132.2 1.601261 1.7521 1008.855 1281.9 2.679161817 4.5
5 576.4 849.4 0.502789 0.7256465 874.9705 1148.0 1.888641 1.946778 1024.277 1297.3 3.149574447 5
5.5 590.4 863.4 0.59428 0.7982112 889.4569 1162.5 2.191579 2.141455 1038.166 1311.2 3.641738488 5.5
6 603.1 876.1 0.691612 0.8707759 902.8056 1175.8 2.509382 2.336133 1050.847 1323.8 4.154264107 6
6.5 614.9 887.9 0.794549 0.9433405 915.141 1188.1 2.841379 2.530811 1062.557 1335.6 4.686031588 6.5
7 625.8 898.8 0.902878 1.0159052 926.5731 1199.6 3.186931 2.725489 1073.47 1346.5 5.236125947 7
7.5 635.9 908.9 1.016407 1.0884698 937.199 1210.2 3.545431 2.920166 1083.716 1356.7 5.803785592 7.5
8 645.5 918.5 1.13496 1.1610345 947.1049 1220.1 3.916305 3.114844 1093.389 1366.4 6.388362836 8
8.5 654.4 927.4 1.258378 1.2335991 956.3668 1229.4 4.299019 3.309522 1102.564 1375.6 6.989293986 8.5
9 662.8 935.8 1.386513 1.3061638 965.0524 1238.1 4.693073 3.5042 1111.296 1384.3 7.60607697 9
9.5 670.8 943.8 1.519229 1.3787284 973.2211 1246.2 5.098005 3.698878 1119.627 1392.6 8.238254759 9.5
10 678.4 951.4 1.656401 1.4512931 980.9261 1253.9 5.513386 3.893555 1127.592 1400.6 8.885403218 10
10.5 685.6 958.6 1.797912 1.5238577 988.214 1261.2 5.938821 4.088233 1135.218 1408.2 9.547122286 10.5
11 692.5 965.5 1.94365 1.5964224 995.1265 1268.1 6.373945 4.282911 1142.528 1415.5 10.22302964 11
11.5 699.1 972.1 2.093515 1.6689871 1001.7 1274.7 6.818424 4.477589 1149.542 1422.5 10.91275619 11.5
12 705.4 978.4 2.24741 1.7415517 1007.968 1281.0 7.271951 4.672266 1156.275 1429.3 11.61594297 12
12.5 711.5 984.5 2.405244 1.8141164 1013.959 1287.0 7.734241 4.866944 1162.741 1435.7 12.33223896 12.5
13 717.3 990.3 2.566932 1.886681 1019.698 1292.7 8.205036 5.061622 1168.954 1442.0 13.06129969 13
13.5 722.9 995.9 2.732394 1.9592457 1014.49 1287.5 8.676219 5.2563 1163.746 1436.7 13.7913791 13.5
14 728.3 1001.3 2.901551 2.0318103 1009.281 1282.3 9.139839 5.450977 1158.538 1431.5 14.51094847 14
14.5 733.5 1006.5 3.074333 2.104375 1004.073 1277.1 9.595987 5.645655 1153.329 1426.3 15.22012168 14.5
15 738.6 1011.6 3.250669 2.1769396 998.8646 1271.9 10.04475 5.840333 1148.121 1421.1 15.9190118 15
15.5 743.4 1016.4 3.430495 2.2495043 993.6563 1266.7 10.48623 6.035011 1142.913 1415.9 16.60773105 15.5
16 748.2 1021.2 3.613747 2.3220689 988.448 1261.4 10.9205 6.229689 1137.704 1410.7 17.28639087 16
16.5 752.7 1025.7 3.800366 2.3946336 983.2396 1256.2 11.34767 6.424366 1132.496 1405.5 17.95510184 16.5
17 757.2 1030.2 3.990295 2.4671983 978.0313 1251.0 11.7678 6.619044 1127.288 1400.3 18.61397376 17
17.5 761.5 1034.5 4.183478 2.5397629 972.823 1245.8 12.181 6.813722 1122.079 1395.1 19.2631156 17.5
18 765.7 1038.7 4.379863 2.6123276 967.6146 1240.6 12.58734 7.0084 1116.871 1389.9 19.90263553 18
18.5 769.7 1042.7 4.579401 2.6848922 962.4063 1235.4 12.98692 7.203077 1111.663 1384.7 20.53264091 18.5
19 773.7 1046.7 4.782042 2.7574569 957.198 1230.2 13.37982 7.397755 1106.454 1379.5 21.15323832 19
19.5 777.6 1050.6 4.98774 2.8300215 951.9896 1225.0 13.76612 7.592433 1101.246 1374.2 21.7645335 19.5
20 781.4 1054.4 5.19645 2.9025862 946.7813 1219.8 14.1459 7.787111 1096.038 1369.0 22.36663143 20
20.5 785.0 1058.0 5.408129 2.9751508 941.573 1214.6 14.51925 7.981788 1090.829 1363.8 22.95963629 20.5
21 788.6 1061.6 5.622736 3.0477155 936.3646 1209.4 14.88626 8.176466 1085.621 1358.6 23.54365146 21
21.5 792.1 1065.1 5.84023 3.1202801 931.1563 1204.2 15.24699 8.371144 1080.413 1353.4 24.11877954 21.5
22 795.6 1068.6 6.060572 3.1928448 925.948 1198.9 15.60154 8.565822 1075.204 1348.2 24.68512234 22
22.5 798.9 1071.9 6.283726 3.2654095 920.7396 1193.7 15.94998 8.760499 1069.996 1343.0 25.2427809 22.5
23 802.2 1075.2 6.509655 3.3379741 915.5313 1188.5 16.29239 8.955177 1064.788 1337.8 25.79185549 23
23.5 805.4 1078.4 6.738324 3.4105388 910.323 1183.3 16.62885 9.149855 1059.579 1332.6 26.33244557 23.5
24 808.5 1081.5 6.969699 3.4831034 905.1146 1178.1 16.95944 9.344533 1054.371 1327.4 26.86464986 24
24.5 811.6 1084.6 7.203747 3.5556681 899.9063 1172.9 17.28424 9.539211 1049.163 1322.2 27.38856631 24.5
25 814.6 1087.6 7.440436 3.6282327 894.698 1167.7 17.60332 9.733888 1043.954 1317.0 27.90429208 25
25.5 817.6 1090.6 7.679736 3.7007974 889.4896 1162.5 17.91675 9.928566 1038.746 1311.7 28.41192361 25.5
26 820.5 1093.5 7.921615 3.773362 884.2813 1157.3 18.22462 10.12324 1033.538 1306.5 28.91155653 26
26.5 823.3 1096.3 8.166046 3.8459267 879.073 1152.1 18.527 10.31792 1028.329 1301.3 29.40328575 26.5
27 826.1 1099.1 8.412999 3.9184913 873.8646 1146.9 18.82395 10.5126 1023.121 1296.1 29.88720542 27
27.5 828.8 1101.8 8.662448 3.991056 868.6563 1141.7 19.11556 10.70728 1017.913 1290.9 30.36340892 27.5
28 831.5 1104.5 8.914364 4.0636206 863.448 1136.4 19.4019 10.90195 1012.704 1285.7 30.8319889 28
28.5 834.1 1107.1 9.168723 4.1361853 858.2396 1131.2 19.68304 11.09663 1007.496 1280.5 31.29303727 28.5
29 836.7 1109.7 9.425499 4.20875 853.0313 1126.0 19.95904 11.29131 1002.288 1275.3 31.74664518 29
29.5 839.3 1112.3 9.684667 4.2813146 847.823 1120.8 20.22999 11.48599 997.0793 1270.1 32.19290306 29.5
30 841.8 1114.8 9.946202 4.3538793 842.6146 1115.6 20.49595 11.68067 991.8709 1264.9 32.63190059 30
30.5 844.3 1117.3 10.21008 4.4264439 837.4063 1110.4 20.75698 11.87534 986.6626 1259.7 33.06372673 30.5
31 846.7 1119.7 10.47628 4.4990086 832.198 1105.2 21.01317 12.07002 981.4543 1254.5 33.4884697 31
31.5 849.1 1122.1 10.74478 4.5715732 826.9896 1100.0 21.26457 12.2647 976.2459 1249.2 33.90621699 31.5
32 851.4 1124.4 11.01556 4.6441379 821.7813 1094.8 21.51125 12.45938 971.0376 1244.0 34.31705539 32
32.5 853.7 1126.7 11.28859 4.7167025 816.573 1089.6 21.75329 12.65405 965.8293 1238.8 34.72107094 32.5
33 856.0 1129.0 11.56386 4.7892672 811.3646 1084.4 21.99074 12.84873 960.6209 1233.6 35.11834899 33
33.5 858.3 1131.3 11.84135 4.8618318 806.1563 1079.2 22.22367 13.04341 955.4126 1228.4 35.50897414 33.5
34 860.5 1133.5 12.12102 4.9343965 800.948 1073.9 22.45215 13.23809 950.2043 1223.2 35.89303032 34
34.5 862.7 1135.7 12.40288 5.0069612 795.7396 1068.7 22.67624 13.43277 944.9959 1218.0 36.27060072 34.5













































Simplified Escape Model Scenario 1
Design Data
Number floors 11
Occupants per floor 14
Building total 154
Breadth of building 21 m
Width of building 21 m
Floor area 441 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 73 m/min uncongested
Stair decent speed, Ss 30 m/min
Longest travel path to exit 27 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 0.78 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.68 m
Occupant density, Do 0.031746 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 44.2 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.3 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min With Alarms opperational
Time from detection till alarm 0.1 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.5 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 0.5 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 1.6 min
Output
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 15.00 minutes
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 14.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 10.5 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 2.00
Eurocode factor of safety 0.97
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.70
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 1
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 4
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 






Simplified Escape Model Scenario 2
Design Data
Number floors 11
Occupants per floor 14
Building total 154
Breadth of building 21 m
Width of building 21 m
Floor area 441 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 36.5 m/min in the dark
Stair decent speed, Ss 15 m/min in the dark
Longest travel path to exit 27 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 0.78 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.68 m
Occupant density, Do 0.031746 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 44.2 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.3 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min With Alarms opperational
Time from detection till alarm 0.1 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.5 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 0.5 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 1.6 min
Output
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 27.77 minutes
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 14.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 10.5 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 1.08
Eurocode factor of safety 0.52
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.38
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 6
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 8
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 






Simplified Escape Model Scenario 3
Design Data
Number floors 11
Occupants per floor 14
Building total 154
Breadth of building 21 m
Width of building 21 m
Floor area 441 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 36.5 m/min in the dark
Stair decent speed, Ss 15 m/min in the dark
Longest travel path to exit 27 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 0.78 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.68 m
Occupant density, Do 0.031746 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 44.2 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.3 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min No alarms
Time from detection till alarm 0.0 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.0 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 5.0 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 5.5 min
*Assume that without alarms it takes
Output five minutes for people to realise that
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 31.67 minutes there is a problem
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 14.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 10.5 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 0.95
Eurocode factor of safety 0.46
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.33
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 8
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 9
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 






Simplified Escape Model Scenario 4
Design Data
Number floors 11
Occupants per floor 14
Building total 154
Breadth of building 21 m
Width of building 21 m
Floor area 441 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 73 m/min uncongested
Stair decent speed, Ss 30 m/min 
Longest travel path to exit 27 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 0.78 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.68 m
Occupant density, Do 0.031746 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 44.2 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.3 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min No alarms
Time from detection till alarm 0.0 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.0 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 5.0 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 5.5 min
*Assume that without alarms it takes
Output five minutes for people to realise that
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 18.90 minutes there is a problem
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 14.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 10.5 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 1.59
Eurocode factor of safety 0.77
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.56
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 4
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 8
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 










MOD. EURO 10.5 minutes
Number of floors 11
People per floor 14
Alarms and Lighting Alarms, No lighting No Alarms, No Lighting No Alarms, Lighting
Total Evacuation Time 15.00 27.77 31.67 18.90
Factor of Safety 0.97 0.52 0.46 0.77
Floors unable to evac. 1 6 8 4
People at risk 14 84 112 56
Required Evac. Time 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5
This page contains results from the four different scenario spreadsheets. The 
data is collected from these sheets automatically via a macro. This macro can 
be run by clicking on the "update" button below. It is important that the scenario 




14 Appendix E; Simulation and Analyses 
Spreadsheets for Building 2. 
 
1. Severity calculations 
2. Raw temperature and severity output data 
3. Time versus temperature plot 
4. Fire severity plot 
5. Simple escape model for Scenario 1 
6. Simple escape model for Scenario 2 
7. Simple escape model for Scenario 3 
8. Simple escape model for Scenario 4 




Time Severity t* Severity t* Severity Time 
Min o C o K MJ/m 2 - o C o K MJ/m 2 - o C o K MJ/m 2 Min
0 20.0 293.0 0 0 0 273.0 0 0 0 273.0 0 0
0.5 261.1 534.1 0.004976 0.0503746 411.7351 684.7 0.008945 0.135146 644.3595 917.4 0.021345039 0.5
1 349.2 622.2 0.023985 0.1007492 584.2933 857.3 0.069056 0.270292 743.8894 1016.9 0.170155605 1
1.5 404.3 677.3 0.054305 0.1511238 664.0096 937.0 0.179252 0.405438 793.1761 1066.2 0.370324225 1.5
2 444.5 717.5 0.094544 0.2014984 707.1566 980.2 0.322875 0.540583 831.8434 1104.8 0.606502124 2
2.5 476.2 749.2 0.143738 0.251873 735.4163 1008.4 0.489121 0.675729 864.272 1137.3 0.875170282 2.5
3 502.3 775.3 0.201156 0.3022476 757.1821 1030.2 0.672737 0.810875 891.8648 1164.9 1.173783348 3
3.5 524.5 797.5 0.266213 0.3526222 775.739 1048.7 0.871317 0.946021 915.5788 1188.6 1.49991991 3.5
4 543.9 816.9 0.338431 0.4029968 792.4052 1065.4 1.083702 1.081167 936.1636 1209.2 1.851313953 4
4.5 561.0 834.0 0.417405 0.4533714 807.7393 1080.7 1.30924 1.216313 954.2152 1227.2 2.225910295 4.5
5 576.4 849.4 0.502789 0.5037459 822.0037 1095.0 1.54748 1.351459 970.2084 1243.2 2.621887367 5
5.5 590.4 863.4 0.59428 0.5541205 835.3432 1108.3 1.798042 1.486605 984.522 1257.5 3.037656089 5.5
6 603.1 876.1 0.691612 0.6044951 847.854 1120.9 2.060572 1.62175 997.4578 1270.5 3.47184495 6
6.5 614.9 887.9 0.794549 0.6548697 859.6099 1132.6 2.334721 1.756896 1009.257 1282.3 3.923278207 6.5
7 625.8 898.8 0.902878 0.7052443 870.6737 1143.7 2.620145 1.892042 1020.113 1293.1 4.390951613 7
7.5 635.9 908.9 1.016407 0.7556189 881.1006 1154.1 2.916501 2.027188 1030.179 1303.2 4.874008297 7.5
8 645.5 918.5 1.13496 0.8059935 890.9407 1163.9 3.223452 2.162334 1039.579 1312.6 5.371716214 8
8.5 654.4 927.4 1.258378 0.8563681 900.2396 1173.2 3.540666 2.29748 1048.413 1321.4 5.883447899 8.5
9 662.8 935.8 1.386513 0.9067427 909.0392 1182.0 3.867821 2.432626 1056.76 1329.8 6.40866274 9
9.5 670.8 943.8 1.519229 0.9571173 917.3778 1190.4 4.204603 2.567772 1064.686 1337.7 6.946891753 9.5
10 678.4 951.4 1.656401 1.0074919 925.2907 1198.3 4.550708 2.702917 1072.241 1345.2 7.497724687 10
10.5 685.6 958.6 1.797912 1.0578665 932.8102 1205.8 4.905844 2.838063 1079.469 1352.5 8.060799226 10.5
11 692.5 965.5 1.94365 1.1082411 939.966 1213.0 5.269732 2.973209 1086.405 1359.4 8.635792012 11
11.5 699.1 972.1 2.093515 1.1586157 946.7855 1219.8 5.642102 3.108355 1093.075 1366.1 9.222411246 11.5
12 705.4 978.4 2.24741 1.2089903 953.2936 1226.3 6.0227 3.243501 1099.505 1372.5 9.820390619 12
12.5 711.5 984.5 2.405244 1.2593649 959.5136 1232.5 6.411282 3.378647 1105.713 1378.7 10.42948437 12.5
13 717.3 990.3 2.566932 1.3097395 965.4665 1238.5 6.807616 3.513793 1111.715 1384.7 11.04946326 13
13.5 722.9 995.9 2.732394 1.3601141 971.1719 1244.2 7.211482 3.648939 1117.526 1390.5 11.68011135 13.5
14 728.3 1001.3 2.901551 1.4104887 976.6476 1249.6 7.622674 3.784084 1123.156 1396.2 12.32122336 14
14.5 733.5 1006.5 3.074333 1.4608632 981.9102 1254.9 8.040994 3.91923 1128.616 1401.6 12.97260262 14.5
15 738.6 1011.6 3.250669 1.5112378 976.7018 1249.7 8.45935 4.054376 1123.408 1396.4 13.62421648 15
15.5 743.4 1016.4 3.430495 1.5616124 971.4935 1244.5 8.87079 4.189522 1118.2 1391.2 14.26618092 15.5
16 748.2 1021.2 3.613747 1.611987 966.2852 1239.3 9.275399 4.324668 1112.991 1386.0 14.8986035 16
16.5 752.7 1025.7 3.800366 1.6623616 961.0768 1234.1 9.673264 4.459814 1107.783 1380.8 15.52159098 16.5
17 757.2 1030.2 3.990295 1.7127362 955.8685 1228.9 10.06447 4.59496 1102.575 1375.6 16.13524934 17
17.5 761.5 1034.5 4.183478 1.7631108 950.6602 1223.7 10.4491 4.730106 1097.366 1370.4 16.73968375 17.5
18 765.7 1038.7 4.379863 1.8134854 945.4518 1218.5 10.82723 4.865251 1092.158 1365.2 17.33499857 18
18.5 769.7 1042.7 4.579401 1.86386 940.2435 1213.2 11.19895 5.000397 1086.95 1359.9 17.92129741 18.5
19 773.7 1046.7 4.782042 1.9142346 935.0352 1208.0 11.56435 5.135543 1081.741 1354.7 18.49868305 19
19.5 777.6 1050.6 4.98774 1.9646092 929.8268 1202.8 11.9235 5.270689 1076.533 1349.5 19.06725752 19.5
20 781.4 1054.4 5.19645 2.0149838 924.6185 1197.6 12.27648 5.405835 1071.325 1344.3 19.62712205 20
20.5 785.0 1058.0 5.408129 2.0653584 919.4102 1192.4 12.62337 5.540981 1066.116 1339.1 20.17837709 20.5
21 788.6 1061.6 5.622736 2.115733 914.2018 1187.2 12.96426 5.676127 1060.908 1333.9 20.72112233 21
21.5 792.1 1065.1 5.84023 2.1661076 908.9935 1182.0 13.29922 5.811273 1055.7 1328.7 21.25545666 21.5
22 795.6 1068.6 6.060572 2.2164822 903.7852 1176.8 13.62832 5.946418 1050.491 1323.5 21.78147824 22
22.5 798.9 1071.9 6.283726 2.2668568 898.5768 1171.6 13.95165 6.081564 1045.283 1318.3 22.29928443 22.5
23 802.2 1075.2 6.509655 2.3172314 893.3685 1166.4 14.26928 6.21671 1040.075 1313.1 22.80897184 23
23.5 805.4 1078.4 6.738324 2.3676059 888.1602 1161.2 14.58129 6.351856 1034.866 1307.9 23.31063631 23.5
24 808.5 1081.5 6.969699 2.4179805 882.9518 1156.0 14.88775 6.487002 1029.658 1302.7 23.80437295 24
24.5 811.6 1084.6 7.203747 2.4683551 877.7435 1150.7 15.18873 6.622148 1024.45 1297.4 24.29027608 24.5
25 814.6 1087.6 7.440436 2.5187297 872.5352 1145.5 15.48432 6.757294 1019.241 1292.2 24.7684393 25
25.5 817.6 1090.6 7.679736 2.5691043 867.3268 1140.3 15.77457 6.89244 1014.033 1287.0 25.23895543 25.5
26 820.5 1093.5 7.921615 2.6194789 862.1185 1135.1 16.05958 7.027585 1008.825 1281.8 25.70191657 26
26.5 823.3 1096.3 8.166046 2.6698535 856.9102 1129.9 16.3394 7.162731 1003.616 1276.6 26.15741407 26.5
27 826.1 1099.1 8.412999 2.7202281 851.7018 1124.7 16.61411 7.297877 998.408 1271.4 26.60553854 27
27.5 828.8 1101.8 8.662448 2.7706027 846.4935 1119.5 16.88377 7.433023 993.1997 1266.2 27.04637985 27.5
28 831.5 1104.5 8.914364 2.8209773 841.2852 1114.3 17.14847 7.568169 987.9914 1261.0 27.48002714 28
28.5 834.1 1107.1 9.168723 2.8713519 836.0768 1109.1 17.40826 7.703315 982.783 1255.8 27.90656882 28.5
29 836.7 1109.7 9.425499 2.9217265 830.8685 1103.9 17.66322 7.838461 977.5747 1250.6 28.32609258 29
29.5 839.3 1112.3 9.684667 2.9721011 825.6602 1098.7 17.91341 7.973607 972.3664 1245.4 28.73868537 29.5
30 841.8 1114.8 9.946202 3.0224757 820.4518 1093.5 18.1589 8.108752 967.158 1240.2 29.14443342 30
30.5 844.3 1117.3 10.21008 3.0728503 815.2435 1088.2 18.39975 8.243898 961.9497 1234.9 29.54342227 30.5
31 846.7 1119.7 10.47628 3.1232249 810.0352 1083.0 18.63604 8.379044 956.7414 1229.7 29.93573671 31
31.5 849.1 1122.1 10.74478 3.1735995 804.8268 1077.8 18.86783 8.51419 951.533 1224.5 30.32146083 31.5
32 851.4 1124.4 11.01556 3.2239741 799.6185 1072.6 19.09519 8.649336 946.3247 1219.3 30.70067801 32
32.5 853.7 1126.7 11.28859 3.2743487 794.4102 1067.4 19.31816 8.784482 941.1164 1214.1 31.07347093 32.5
33 856.0 1129.0 11.56386 3.3247232 789.2018 1062.2 19.53683 8.919628 935.908 1208.9 31.43992157 33
33.5 858.3 1131.3 11.84135 3.3750978 783.9935 1057.0 19.75125 9.054773 930.6997 1203.7 31.80011118 33.5
34 860.5 1133.5 12.12102 3.4254724 778.7852 1051.8 19.96149 9.189919 925.4914 1198.5 32.15412036 34
34.5 862.7 1135.7 12.40288 3.475847 773.5768 1046.6 20.1676 9.325065 920.283 1193.3 32.50202897 34.5















































Simplified Escape Model Scenario 1
Design Data
Number floors 10
Occupants per floor 36
Building total 360
Breadth of building 26 m
Width of building 21 m
Floor area 546 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 73 m/min uncongested
Stair decent speed, Ss 60 m/min
Longest travel path to exit 20 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 1 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.9 m
Occupant density, Do 0.0659341 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 58.5 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.6 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min With Alarms opperational
Time from detection till alarm 0.1 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.5 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 0.5 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 1.6 min
Output
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 8.70 minutes
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 16.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 12 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 3.45
Eurocode factor of safety 1.90
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 1.38
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro -10
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro -5
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 






Simplified Escape Model Scenario 2
Design Data
Number floors 10
Occupants per floor 36
Building total 360
Breadth of building 26 m
Width of building 21 m
Floor area 546 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 36.5 m/min in the dark
Stair decent speed, Ss 30 m/min in the dark
Longest travel path to exit 20 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 1 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.9 m
Occupant density, Do 0.0659341 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 58.5 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.6 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min With Alarms opperational
Time from detection till alarm 0.1 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.5 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 0.5 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 1.6 min
Output
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 14.58 minutes
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 16.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 12 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 2.06
Eurocode factor of safety 1.13
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.82
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro -1
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 3
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 






Simplified Escape Model Scenario 3
Design Data
Number floors 10
Occupants per floor 36
Building total 360
Breadth of building 26 m
Width of building 21 m
Floor area 546 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 36.5 m/min in the dark
Stair decent speed, Ss 30 m/min in the dark
Longest travel path to exit 20 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 1 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.9 m
Occupant density, Do 0.0659341 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 58.5 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.6 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min No alarms
Time from detection till alarm 0.0 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.0 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 5.0 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 5.5 min
*Assume that without alarms it takes
Output five minutes for people to realise that
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 18.48 minutes there is a problem
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 16.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 12 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 1.62
Eurocode factor of safety 0.89
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.65
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 2
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 6
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 






Simplified Escape Model Scenario 4
Design Data
Number floors 10
Occupants per floor 36
Building total 360
Breadth of building 26 m
Width of building 21 m
Floor area 546 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 73 m/min uncongested
Stair decent speed, Ss 60 m/min 
Longest travel path to exit 20 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 1 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.9 m
Occupant density, Do 0.0659341 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 58.5 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.6 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min No alarms
Time from detection till alarm 0.0 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.0 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 5.0 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 5.5 min
*Assume that without alarms it takes
Output five minutes for people to realise that
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 12.60 minutes there is a problem
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 16.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 12 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 2.38
Eurocode factor of safety 1.31
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.95
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro -6
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 2
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 










MOD. EURO 12 minutes
Number of floors 10
People per floor 36
Alarms and Lighting Alarms, No lighting No Alarms, No Lighting No Alarms, Lighting
Total Evacuation Time 8.70 14.58 18.48 12.60
Factor of Safety 1.90 1.13 0.89 1.31
Floors unable to evac. -10 -1 2 -6
People at risk 0 0 72 0
Available Evac. Time 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5
This page contains results from the four different scenario spreadsheets. The 
data is collected from these sheets automatically via a macro. This macro can 
be run by clicking on the "update" button below. It is important that the scenario 




15 Appendix F; Simulation and Analyses 
Spreadsheets for Building 3. 
 
1. Severity calculations 
2. Raw temperature and severity output data 
3. Time versus temperature plot 
4. Fire severity plot 
5. Simple escape model for Scenario 1 
6. Simple escape model for Scenario 2 
7. Simple escape model for Scenario 3 
8. Simple escape model for Scenario 4 




Time Severity t* Severity t* Severity Time 
Min o C o K MJ/m 2 - o C o K MJ/m 2 - o C o K MJ/m 2 Min
0 20.0 293.0 0 0 0 273.0 0 0 0 273.0 0 0
0.5 261.1 534.1 0.004976 0.0402503 355.628 628.6 0.007026 0.107984 599.53 872.5 0.018306703 0.5
1 349.2 622.2 0.023985 0.0805006 531.3403 804.3 0.051852 0.215969 716.28 989.3 0.146046342 1
1.5 404.3 677.3 0.054305 0.120751 622.7429 895.7 0.140662 0.323953 765.4679 1038.5 0.325784428 1.5
2 444.5 717.5 0.094544 0.1610013 674.3722 947.4 0.263348 0.431937 801.3568 1074.4 0.537639166 2
2.5 476.2 749.2 0.143738 0.2012516 706.9918 980.0 0.410051 0.539921 831.6707 1104.7 0.777321043 2.5
3 502.3 775.3 0.201156 0.2415019 730.2982 1003.3 0.574537 0.647906 858.0273 1131.0 1.042926432 3
3.5 524.5 797.5 0.266213 0.2817522 748.8345 1021.8 0.75335 0.75589 881.155 1154.2 1.332839471 3.5
4 543.9 816.9 0.338431 0.3220026 764.7433 1037.7 0.944642 0.863874 901.5815 1174.6 1.645494739 4
4.5 561.0 834.0 0.417405 0.3622529 779.0478 1052.0 1.147409 0.971859 919.736 1192.7 1.979390054 4.5
5 576.4 849.4 0.502789 0.4025032 792.249 1065.2 1.361063 1.079843 935.975 1209.0 2.333116329 5
5.5 590.4 863.4 0.59428 0.4427535 804.6026 1077.6 1.58522 1.187827 950.5958 1223.6 2.705376306 5.5
6 603.1 876.1 0.691612 0.4830038 816.249 1089.2 1.819589 1.295811 963.8462 1236.8 3.094992379 6
6.5 614.9 887.9 0.794549 0.5232542 827.2734 1100.3 2.063922 1.403796 975.9327 1248.9 3.500906652 6.5
7 625.8 898.8 0.902878 0.5635045 837.7342 1110.7 2.317987 1.51178 987.0281 1260.0 3.922176015 7
7.5 635.9 908.9 1.016407 0.6037548 847.6757 1120.7 2.581561 1.619764 997.2764 1270.3 4.357964255 7.5
8 645.5 918.5 1.13496 0.6440051 857.135 1130.1 2.854421 1.727749 1006.798 1279.8 4.80753264 8
8.5 654.4 927.4 1.258378 0.6842554 866.1443 1139.1 3.136348 1.835733 1015.694 1288.7 5.270229938 8.5
9 662.8 935.8 1.386513 0.7245058 874.7329 1147.7 3.427122 1.943717 1024.047 1297.0 5.745482513 9
9.5 670.8 943.8 1.519229 0.7647561 882.9276 1155.9 3.726526 2.051701 1031.93 1304.9 6.23278488 9.5
10 678.4 951.4 1.656401 0.8050064 890.7532 1163.8 4.034347 2.159686 1039.401 1312.4 6.73169095 10
10.5 685.6 958.6 1.797912 0.8452567 898.2328 1171.2 4.350372 2.26767 1046.509 1319.5 7.241806071 10.5
11 692.5 965.5 1.94365 0.885507 905.388 1178.4 4.674394 2.375654 1053.296 1326.3 7.762779902 11
11.5 699.1 972.1 2.093515 0.9257574 912.2389 1185.2 5.006212 2.483639 1059.799 1332.8 8.294300104 11.5
12 705.4 978.4 2.24741 0.9660077 918.8043 1191.8 5.345629 2.591623 1066.045 1339.0 8.836086808 12
12.5 711.5 984.5 2.405244 1.006258 925.1017 1198.1 5.692451 2.699607 1072.06 1345.1 9.387887793 12.5
13 717.3 990.3 2.566932 1.0465083 931.1475 1204.1 6.046495 2.807591 1077.866 1350.9 9.949474324 13
13.5 722.9 995.9 2.732394 1.0867586 936.9571 1210.0 6.407579 2.915576 1083.481 1356.5 10.52063755 13.5
14 728.3 1001.3 2.901551 1.127009 942.5446 1215.5 6.775531 3.02356 1088.919 1361.9 11.10118544 14
14.5 733.5 1006.5 3.074333 1.1672593 947.9236 1220.9 7.150182 3.131544 1094.195 1367.2 11.69094013 14.5
15 738.6 1011.6 3.250669 1.2075096 953.1066 1226.1 7.531372 3.239529 1099.319 1372.3 12.28973573 15
15.5 743.4 1016.4 3.430495 1.2477599 958.1051 1231.1 7.918946 3.347513 1104.301 1377.3 12.89741638 15.5
16 748.2 1021.2 3.613747 1.2880102 962.9302 1235.9 8.312755 3.455497 1109.15 1382.2 13.51383466 16
16.5 752.7 1025.7 3.800366 1.3282606 967.592 1240.6 8.712657 3.563481 1113.873 1386.9 14.13885027 16.5
17 757.2 1030.2 3.990295 1.3685109 972.1001 1245.1 9.118515 3.671466 1118.476 1391.5 14.77232884 17
17.5 761.5 1034.5 4.183478 1.4087612 976.4635 1249.5 9.530197 3.77945 1122.966 1396.0 15.41414102 17.5
18 765.7 1038.7 4.379863 1.4490115 980.6904 1253.7 9.94758 3.887434 1127.347 1400.3 16.06416166 18
18.5 769.7 1042.7 4.579401 1.4892618 984.7887 1257.8 10.37054 3.995419 1131.623 1404.6 16.72226917 18.5
19 773.7 1046.7 4.782042 1.5295121 988.7657 1261.8 10.79897 4.103403 1135.799 1408.8 17.38834492 19
19.5 777.6 1050.6 4.98774 1.5697625 992.6281 1265.6 11.23276 4.211387 1139.878 1412.9 18.06227287 19.5
20 781.4 1054.4 5.19645 1.6100128 996.3824 1269.4 11.6718 4.319371 1143.864 1416.9 18.74393911 20
20.5 785.0 1058.0 5.408129 1.6502631 1000.035 1273.0 12.11599 4.427356 1147.76 1420.8 19.43323161 20.5
21 788.6 1061.6 5.622736 1.6905134 1003.59 1276.6 12.56524 4.53534 1151.568 1424.6 20.13003996 21
21.5 792.1 1065.1 5.84023 1.7307637 1007.054 1280.1 13.01946 4.643324 1155.291 1428.3 20.83425514 21.5
22 795.6 1068.6 6.060572 1.7710141 1010.432 1283.4 13.47856 4.751309 1158.932 1431.9 21.54576943 22
22.5 798.9 1071.9 6.283726 1.8112644 1013.728 1286.7 13.94246 4.859293 1162.492 1435.5 22.26447619 22.5
23 802.2 1075.2 6.509655 1.8515147 1016.947 1289.9 14.41109 4.967277 1165.974 1439.0 22.99026983 23
23.5 805.4 1078.4 6.738324 1.891765 1020.091 1293.1 14.88436 5.075261 1169.38 1442.4 23.72304573 23.5
24 808.5 1081.5 6.969699 1.9320153 1023.166 1296.2 15.3622 5.183246 1172.712 1445.7 24.46270013 24
24.5 811.6 1084.6 7.203747 1.9722657 1026.175 1299.2 15.84455 5.29123 1175.972 1449.0 25.20913015 24.5
25 814.6 1087.6 7.440436 2.012516 1029.12 1302.1 16.33134 5.399214 1179.161 1452.2 25.96223375 25
25.5 817.6 1090.6 7.679736 2.0527663 1032.006 1305.0 16.82251 5.507199 1182.281 1455.3 26.72190966 25.5
26 820.5 1093.5 7.921615 2.0930166 1034.834 1307.8 17.318 5.615183 1185.333 1458.3 27.48805744 26
26.5 823.3 1096.3 8.166046 2.1332669 1037.608 1310.6 17.81775 5.723167 1188.32 1461.3 28.26057744 26.5
27 826.1 1099.1 8.412999 2.1735173 1040.33 1313.3 18.32172 5.831151 1191.243 1464.2 29.0393708 27
27.5 828.8 1101.8 8.662448 2.2137676 1043.003 1316.0 18.82984 5.939136 1194.103 1467.1 29.82433948 27.5
28 831.5 1104.5 8.914364 2.2540179 1045.629 1318.6 19.34207 6.04712 1196.901 1469.9 30.61538625 28
28.5 834.1 1107.1 9.168723 2.2942682 1048.209 1321.2 19.85836 6.155104 1199.639 1472.6 31.4124147 28.5
29 836.7 1109.7 9.425499 2.3345185 1050.746 1323.7 20.37866 6.263089 1202.319 1475.3 32.21532926 29
29.5 839.3 1112.3 9.684667 2.3747689 1053.242 1326.2 20.90294 6.371073 1204.941 1477.9 33.02403523 29.5
30 841.8 1114.8 9.946202 2.4150192 1055.698 1328.7 21.43114 6.479057 1207.507 1480.5 33.83843877 30
30.5 844.3 1117.3 10.21008 2.4552695 1058.116 1331.1 21.96324 6.587041 1210.018 1483.0 34.65844692 30.5
31 846.7 1119.7 10.47628 2.4955198 1060.498 1333.5 22.49919 6.695026 1212.475 1485.5 35.48396763 31
31.5 849.1 1122.1 10.74478 2.5357701 1062.844 1335.8 23.03895 6.80301 1214.879 1487.9 36.31490976 31.5
32 851.4 1124.4 11.01556 2.5760205 1065.157 1338.2 23.58249 6.910994 1217.232 1490.2 37.1511831 32
32.5 853.7 1126.7 11.28859 2.6162708 1067.437 1340.4 24.12977 7.018979 1219.535 1492.5 37.9926984 32.5
33 856.0 1129.0 11.56386 2.6565211 1069.686 1342.7 24.68076 7.126963 1221.789 1494.8 38.83936734 33
33.5 858.3 1131.3 11.84135 2.6967714 1071.905 1344.9 25.23544 7.234947 1223.994 1497.0 39.69110259 33.5
34 860.5 1133.5 12.12102 2.7370217 1074.095 1347.1 25.79376 7.342931 1226.152 1499.2 40.5478178 34
34.5 862.7 1135.7 12.40288 2.7772721 1076.256 1349.3 26.3557 7.450916 1228.264 1501.3 41.4094276 34.5
















































Simplified Escape Model Scenario 1
Design Data
Number floors 16
Occupants per floor 90
Building total 1440
Breadth of building 36 m
Width of building 26 m
Floor area 936 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 73 m/min uncongested
Stair decent speed, Ss 60 m/min
Longest travel path to exit 20 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 1 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.9 m
Occupant density, Do 0.0961538 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 58.5 people/min
Queuing time, tq 1.5 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min With Alarms opperational
Time from detection till alarm 0.1 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.5 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 0.5 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 1.6 min
Output
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 14.15 minutes
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 17.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 12.5 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 2.12
Eurocode factor of safety 1.24
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.88
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro -4
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 3
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 






Simplified Escape Model Scenario 2
Design Data
Number floors 16
Occupants per floor 5
Building total 80
Breadth of building 36 m
Width of building 26 m
Floor area 936 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 36.5 m/min in the dark
Stair decent speed, Ss 30 m/min in the dark
Longest travel path to exit 20 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 1 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.9 m
Occupant density, Do 0.0053419 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 58.5 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.1 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min With Alarms opperational
Time from detection till alarm 0.1 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.5 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 0.5 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 1.6 min
Output
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 20.72 minutes
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 17.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 12.5 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 1.45
Eurocode factor of safety 0.84
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.60
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 3
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 7
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 






Simplified Escape Model Scenario 3
Design Data
Number floors 16
Occupants per floor 5
Building total 80
Breadth of building 26 m
Width of building 36 m
Floor area 936 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 36.5 m/min in the dark
Stair decent speed, Ss 30 m/min in the dark
Longest travel path to exit 20 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 1 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.9 m
Occupant density, Do 0.0053419 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 58.5 people/min
Queuing time, tq 0.1 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min No alarms
Time from detection till alarm 0.0 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.0 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 8.0 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 8.5 min
*Assume that without alarms it takes
Output eight minutes for people to realise that
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 27.62 minutes there is a problem
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 17.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 12.5 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 1.09
Eurocode factor of safety 0.63
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.45
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 9
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 13
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 






Simplified Escape Model Scenario 4
Design Data
Number floors 16
Occupants per floor 90
Building total 1440
Breadth of building 36 m
Width of building 26 m
Floor area 936 m2
Length of each run of stairs 12 m
Speed around floor, Sf 73 m/min uncongested
Stair decent speed, Ss 60 m/min 
Longest travel path to exit 20 m
Queuing Delays
Width of stairway exit, Wex 1 m
Width of boundary layer, B 0.05 m
Effective width, We 0.9 m
Occupant density, Do 0.0961538 people/m
2
Specific flow through door, Fs 65.0 people/min/m
Actual flow through door, Fa 58.5 people/min
Queuing time, tq 1.5 minutes
Reaction times
Time from ignition till detection 0.5 min No alarms
Time from detection till alarm 0.0 min
Time until occupants decide to respond 0.0 min,  (from time of alarm)
Time for occupants to investigate the fire 3.0 min,  (collect belongings, fight the fire etc)
Total time to react to fire 3.5 min
*Assume that without alarms it takes
Output three minutes for people to realise that
Time taken to evacuate the building, t* 16.05 minutes there is a problem
Time until stairs penetrated by ISO fire 30 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Eurocode fire 17.5 min
Time until stairs penetrated by Mod. Eurocode fire 12.5 min
ISO Fire factor of safety 1.87
Eurocode factor of safety 1.09
Mod. Eurocode factor of safety 0.78
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro -2
Floors unable to be evacuated, Euro 6
This simplified escape model assumes that the time taken to evacuate a multi-storey building with a single 
stair is dependant on the time taken by the last person on the top floor to exit the building. It assumes that exit 
geometries do not vary from floor to floor and that the evacuation of each sucessive floor is delayed by the 










MOD. EURO 12.5 minutes
Number of floors 16
People per floor 90 Daytime
People per floor 5 Night time
Alarms and Lighting Alarms, No lighting No Alarms, No Lighting No Alarms, Lighting
Total Evacuation Time 14.15 20.72 27.62 16.05
Factor of Safety 1.24 0.84 0.63 1.09
Floors unable to evac. -4 3 9 -2
People at risk 0 15 45 0
Required Evac. Time 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5
This page contains results from the four different scenario spreadsheets. The 
data is collected from these sheets automatically via a macro. This macro can 
be run by clicking on the "update" button below. It is important that the scenario 
spreadsheets are not open when this macro is run! 
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